‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدليستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎١‎٢] (٣٨٦/٢٨)

11
The second question propounded was—'‘What action would it be expedient
for Great Britain to take in the event of disorders occurring in Persia, and
occasioning a Russian occupation in the North—or in anticipation of such
disorder it being understood that occupation of Persian territory would not be
directed against Russia, but would be undertaken in the interests of peace
and order, and as an assertion of the position of Great Britain as jointly
interested* with Russia in the maintenance of the Persian kingdom ? ” It was
proposed that in this event we should at once occupy Bunder Abbas and
the three islands of Ormuz, Kishm, and Henjam; that we should protect
British interests at Bushire; and that we should occupy, or be prepared to
occupy, Seistan with an adequate force of troops from India.
The third question was “ in what particular portions of Persia and by what
methods can the extension of British influence be most successfully prosecuted
and to the best advantage for general purposes and for the contingencies above
discussed V* It was held that, consistently with the decisions on the two preced
ing points, preparations should steadily be made for the occupation of Seistan
bv extending the railway beyondNushki and pushing our trade; that we should
re-assert our°claims at Bassidore and on the Musandim Promontory, especially in
the Elphinstone Inlet, and support the authority of the Chief of Shargah
over the coast from Dihba to Khor Kalba. All possible care should be taken
to prevent any other Power from gaining a footing at Bunder Abbas or on any
of the neighbouring islands. For the rest, we should continue to encourage
trade on the Karun, to maintain our position at Bushire, and to support
Persia as long as possible by peaceful means. On behalf of the Admiralty,
Prince Louis of Battenburg explained that the establishment of a Russian
coal depot at Charbar might be a convenience for their cruisers and transports
goinu- to the Far East in time of peace, but had no serious significance in case
of war so long as it was not fortified and provided with communications by
land with a Russian base. It was further agreed that the most effective
check to Russian progress towards South Persia lay in the completion of the
railway from Constantinople to Baghdad, as it would biing the Tuiks in
force on the flank of a Russian advance. It was recommended, therefore, that
we should encourage the project to the test of our power, provided we could
acquire our proper share of control of the railway and its outlet on the
Persian Gulf.
The opinion of Lord Curzon’s Government was invited on the proposals
thus tormulated, and was expressed at length in a despatch, dated the
4th February 1904. The contingency most prominently held in view was
the second of those discussed by the
Lord Curzon’s views- Departmental Committee, and the view
was urged that, though the measures suggested might be adequate in the
event of the Russian movement being confined to such a single point as
Tabriz on the west or Meshed on the east, yet in the event of a larger
movement covering the whole of Northern Persia it would be advisable
that the British reply should include a wider sphere than that proposed,
and that Bushire and Mohammerah should both be occupied, and possibly even
an advance be made on Ispahan. In recommending this course, Lord Curzon’s
Government laid stress on the consideration that the object ot Russia was
not so much the direct annexation of any portion of Persian territory as the
gradual acouisition of control over the central Government, with a view to the
reduction of Persia to the position of the Central Asian Khanates; that it
was unlikely, therefore, that a British occupation in the South wouhL bring
our troops face to face with those of Russia ; and that we should look to British
movements, not as intended to be permanent, but as a means of bringing
nres<ure to bear upon Russia to withdraw from the North, and thus avoid a
precipitation of the dissolution of Persia, and the placing of a permanent
barrier in the wav of her southern advance. Dissent was further expressed
from the view that the presence of the Baghdad Railway on the flank
of a Russian advance was likely to be of any material benefit, and from the
opinion that German assistance should be sought in the defence of interests
which were exclusively our own.