"سيستان، بلاد فارس وسيستان" [و‎‎١‎١‎٧] (٦١٧/٢٣٨)

t 15 ]
(v) Secret E., June 1891, Nos. 171-181 is full of ;„t„ o r
ra'lway schemes, including memoranda written in October r8?g Pape / S n a I"l n0tes about
Sir Henry Brackenbury, when Director of Mint., t , J,. 9 ani1 Oetober 1890 by
Sir Edwin Collen noted in November 1890—“Speaking fn t* tbe War Office,
say that the project for a railway from BalS™ to sS DepM 1
a great strategical victory." Sir Henry Brackenbury said— W ° UM ’ lf earaed ° Dt > 1,6
‘ So long as Russian railway communication does not extend south of fl,„«. • y
Trans-Caspian hue, my opinion is that she cannot invade Britth India thw 8
larger than our army could deal nwri u r u *™ stl ln aia with forces
which would cause herVelndt'r Sa^utWri*'^ ^ Sh ° U,i i0
“To construct a railway to Seistan would, it seems to me, compel her to make such
^dToTV Itw< »; ld t beto PV the g^o£ ^ Russian military party .
and to hasten on what we should endeavour to postpone. ^
“ But the circumstances should change, and Russia should take the lead in making
railways southwards, then it may be necessary for us to follow her lead- a^d we
shall be in a better position to do so if all possible lines are previously'surveyed
We are sure to have the earliest information of any such attempts on her part and
we ought to be able to keep pace with her” ^ u
Lord Lansdowne thereupon noted—
The political objection has been stated with great force by General Brackenbury. I
concur with what he has written, and I am convinced that a sudden access of
activity on our part would lead to corresponding activity in railway development
on the part of Russia. Our policy is to obtain as much knowledge as we can
of the routes along which we may ultimately be compelled to construct lines of
railway.”
It was practically settled that a reconnaissance for a line to Nushki should be made ; but
when the case went to the Finance Department, Sir David Barbour asked what this was to
lead up to and said —“ If it is intended to make this reconnaissance the starting point for a
railway towards the Helmand, or the Persian frontier, I think the whole case should be put
forward and considered before any further steps are taken.”
The case was then brought up in Council on the 21st May 1891 and the order was—“No
further action required regarding reconnaissance.”
8. Before examining later papers, I will give here a few extracts from the Hon’ble
G. N. Curzon^s ‘ Persia/ which was published in 1892 :—
“ Seistan presents to Russia a positive and a negative value should she at any
r, t _ OOQ time find it politic or necessary to
Yol. I, pages 6- . absorb Khorassan, the possession of
Seistan would give her the whole, and not the northern portion only, of that
province Russia in Khorassan means Russia at Herat; and Russia in Seistan
would mean Russia at Sebzewar and Farrah as well, the two most important
strategical points on the march from Herat to Kandahar.
“ I do not for a moment lay stress upon the other aspect of the positive value to
Russia of Seistan— viz., as facilitating her approach to the Southern Seas—because
I assume that a Russian port upon the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean would
no more be tolerated by any English Minister or Government than would an
English port on the Caspian by any Czar The negative value of Seistan to
Rufsia is the inverse aspect of its positive value to Great Britain. In other words,
Russia would like to get hold of Seistan herself, in order to prevent Seistan from
W got hold of by Great Britain; and because, in the latter event, not only wouffi
the ambitious andfor-reaehing schemes that I have sbet f ad b ? b //^/
England would be in a /
rival The adianta ewi \r or th Eastern Persia with her manufactures,
enables Russia to flood the markets -n the bazars of Meshed
and to undersell her sole competitor, g VeD terms with her
The one means by which the latter could comp 7 railway 0 n the
"l^o'mal’if MnXii ^ 0 ^ 0 ^ Such a Railway
starting from India must point, as its first objective, to Seistan.
starting trom rnu a r ’ .. ... t j think be denied, as bringing
a°flanklng positio/in defenciTofthat Afghan°territory which she has undertaken
“ The potential ^sources'of Seistan and the uses of ^s
Yol. I, page 629. border are so great that
such a railroad might in time become a profitable speculation
and exit
the east
I believe