"سيستان، بلاد فارس وسيستان" [و‎‎٢‎٦‎٧] (٦١٧/٥٤١)

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relieved of the representation of Russian intere^ in -i *
y eai \ was then announced that a Russian named^ZiedW ^
appointed Russian Consul in Seistan—-nn „ mea , Zl edler, had been
diately followed by the despatch of Captain Sykes^MtLto BrMsh C “T®'
Kerman to Seistan in a similar capacity! The Russian Consul wSdd
not yet to have taken up his post; and the Russian authoritielare 1
5,. 1 : EfotSi.' nes * “* 0^0 of Her Majesty’s Qoyerameut before deoidbg
former labours W and 1 on The ^n' Zar J 3U( ^ n y re -appeared upon the scene of his
\r o r ’ ?> • present occasion pushed his politico-scientific
studies as far south as Persian Baluchistan and B^mpur. Early in the present
year the Agent to the Governor-General at Meshed reported that two Russian
officers, 1 doctor and 10 Cossacks were still at 1 Turhat-i-Haidari, and
1 Russian Officer, 2 Medical Assistants and 10 Cossacks at Karez. There are
also 58 Persian sowars scattered about at different places between Meshed and
Seistan, who are paid through the Russian officers and take their orders from
them. The recrudescence of plague in India has in fact provided an excuse for
the continuance, just as its original appearance was pleaded in support of the in
troduction, of a (juusi -Russian Protectorate in Southern Khorasan. A more
active assertion of the same pretensions has since been witnessed in the mission of
M!. Stroeff, Dragoman to the Russian Consulate at Meshed, with presents valued
at El,TOO, to the Persian Governor of Rain, who is brother to the Governor of
Seistan and is believed to covet the succession to that post. The sanitary plea
was also advanced in the course of the past summer to explain the despatch of
Russian dectors to Rerman and even to Shiraz. An interesting commentary
upon these proceedings may be found in an observation in Lieutenant Webb
Ware’s report upon the Quetta-Seistan trade route for 1897-98, where he says
that “ the chief hindrance to the further development of this route is to be found
in the obstructive measures taken by the Russian officers striving to further the
interests of that country at the expense of India”.
31. The facts which we have enumerated will, we think, be sufficient
to convince Your Lordship of two propositions: firstly, that Russia regards
with unconcealed aversion the opening of the British commercial route from
India to Seistan and Rhorasan, and will spare no efforts to rob it of success;
secondly, that she regards with an interested eye the future of Seistan itself,
and is already preparing, by a display of armed force and by the assumption of
executive authority, to pave the way for an eventual inclusion within the
Russian sphere of that portion of the Shah’s dominions.
35. In tbe same context, and as illustrating the political and strategical
object which such an advance may be believed to have in view, it will not
be forgotten that during the past few years, the Russian Government have
constructed a railway from Merv to Rushk upon the Afghan frontier within
80 miles of Herat, and have stacked at the terminus the railway plant for a
future extension to Herat itself. Should any doubt be entertained as to the
purpose for which this extension (which is destitute of any commercial justifi
cation) was planned, it may be solved by a reference to the frank admission
made to Sir N. O’Conor by M. deWitte, Russian Minister of Einance, in June
1898, that it was designed “ to enable Russia to attack Afghanistan in case of
complications with England ”. Wlien it is remembered that such an attack
can only be made in direct violation of solemn international engagements, it is
not, we think, incumbent upon us to argue at further length that the political
ambitions of Russia in Eastern Persia, and in close proximity to the Afghan
bolder, have an ulterior significance which it would be folly to ignore.
36. Nor can we divorce these proceedings from the idea that, in seeking
to obtain a preferential footing in Seistan, Russia is not merely endeavouring
to block a promising avenue of Anglo-Indian trade, and to acquire a position
of potential menace to British interests on the western flank of Afghanistan
but that she is also concerned in the prosecution of an advance, which is n
expected to terminate until it has brought her to the Persian Gulf. It is known