مراسلات مع أ. ج. بلفور، السير ر. وينجيت، اللورد ألنبي، اللورد ميلنر وآخرين في مصر [و‎‎٤] (٣٠٠/٧)

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the note of 1904. The only way of attainment was therefore by way of negotiation or
exchange. The conception of Jaghbub as a pawn at once revived.
But the mind of those in authority had now undergone a change, not to say a
complete reversal. It was discovered that the cession of Jaghbub was dangerous, even
impossible. We could not afford to offend the Senussi, and with them Islam. Apart
from the political danger of the cession, our military authorities so far differed from
Lord Kitchener and their own view of 1912 as to reach the view that Jaghbub was
strategically important. This was confirmed by the Committee of Imperial Defence
as lately as April 1917. The view had been developed in a War Office memorandum of
the 28th March, 1917, beginning “ From a strategical point of view it is of great
importance that Jaghbub should remain within the Egyptian border.”
Long ere this, however, we had abandoned the idea of giving Jaghbub to get
Bardia and Has el Milh. Lord Kitchener had mooted another method. We were to
offer the Italians a strip of desert in the interior in order to get a strip of desert on the
coast with Port Bardia and the whole Gulf of Solium. We had not the face to go to
the Italians with such a proposal, and it dropped.
Thereafter we were reduced to suggested shifts. Thus the Foreign Office suggested
to Lord Kitchener in 1913 that if no compensation for Bardia other than Jaghbub could
be found, we might conclude with Italy a self-denying ordinance whereby the two
Governments should bind themselves respectively not to fortify Solium and Port
Bardia. Lord Kitchener in turn suggested to the Foreign Office in 1916 that, taking
the 1904 note for our text, we should argue that Has Solium was “a geographical
feature and not a point” and therefore included the whole promontory together with
Bardia.
The above, which is the briefest possible summary of a lengthy tangle of notes and
memoranda, is given to show that we are on weak ground for claiming any extension of our
frontier beyond Beacon Point—the point to which the Italians have explicitly desired
to pin us—and that we know it.
There might conceivably be some case for opening our mouths a little in this
direction if we were going to fill the Italian maw in other spheres. This, however,
seems most unlikely to be the case ; indeed all points to the probability of our being
unable to satisfy their appetite with any adequate ration of Asia Minor. Given then
that the Italians will be somewhat disappointed elsewhere, it seems both unwise and
impracticable to embark upon a weak case for dispute in Africa. It is certainly most
desirable to get Bardia, but we must cut our coat according to our cloth.
Moreover, article 13 of the pact of the 26th April, 1915, by which we obtained
Italy’s entry into the war, runs as follows :—
/ .
“If France and Great Britain should increase their colonial domains in Africa
at the expense of Germany, these two Powers recognise in principle that Italy
might claim some equitable compensations, notably by the settlement in her
favour of the questions concerning the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Erythrsea,
Somaliland and Lybia, and of the colonies neighbours to France and Great
Britain.”
Granted the premiss, it is highly likely that Italy will avail herself of this to press
for Jaghbub, which she has always desired The utmost then that we could do would
be to defend our previous position without carrying the tussle into her territory by
striving for Port Bardia. One can therefore only express concurrence in the finding
of the Committee of Imperial Defence in the report already mentioned, viz., that—
“ In the event of its proving impossible to satisfy Italian claims in any other
way, the Committee realise that it may be necessary, whilst retaining Jaghbub,
to cede Solium. The western frontier of Egypt might then be fixed as follows:
starting from a point along the coast 11 miles east by south of Solium and
continuing in a straight line to the intersection of the 24th meridian of longitude
east with the 30th parallel of latitude north, and thence following the
24th meridian as at present. This concession, although not large territorially, is
important to the Italians, as Solium is the starting point of the caravan route
to Jaghbub, and a principal market of the Senussi community.”
This solution cannot be recommended except under stress, since Solium might
eventually furnish a submarine base against Alexandria. Besides, Jaghbub would be of
jittle or no use to use without Solium. The point is, however, that we should recognise
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