ملف ١١٦٦/ ١٩٢٥ "الجزيرة العربية: نجد؛ المفاوضات مع ابن سعود بشأن مسألة العراق-نجد وحدود شرق الأردن؛ بعثة السير ج. كلايتون؛ اتفاقية بحرة، الثاني من نوفمبر ١٩٢٥" [و‎‎١‎٣‎٨] (٧٦٩/٢٨٢)

Sixth Meeting.
9 Jnf S1 "?h ^ P , laCe ° n Monda y» the 19th October, at
y a.m., with the same attendance'as before.
drift e a nqUlred r h l th t r ,^ is Hi ^ hness had been able to study the
seen it ^but Tt ei !rd W t ’ 1 ^ dr t Wn UP ' and he replied that had
seen it but it did not appear to him to make any change from what
had been proposed at the Kuweit Conference. 1 said that, although
the draft did not contain everything that His Highness desired it
the 8 ‘Iracfcm lr t ^, wish . es of His Ma Jesty’s Government and
Iraq Government while going as far as possible in the direction
required by Nejd. I hoped, therefore, that he would be able to
, f , aS , an ^ stru m ea t which would improve the existing situa-
lon on the frontier. I repeated that the Government of ‘Iraq were
removpd en t e ^ etlC V'™ m re&ard to the Ne i d Shammar and had
unoved them as far as possible from the Nejd frontier.
I bn Sa'ud said that he had heard of the removal of the Shammar
to the .Mosul district, but he did not believe that any substantial im
provement would result; apparently they had been raiding again
m the direction of Jauf, and he believed they were in that area at
the present moment. He had no fear as far as his own tribes were
concerned, and he pressed his point, first, because his religion and
his honour demanded it, and secondly, because he was convinced
that peace and order on the frontier could only be attained by the
acceptance of a principle which he felt sure would prove to be the
only deterrent. An agreement such as that now drafted would, he
feared, be a solution in name only, though he would of course
oyally subscribe to the terms of any agreement to which he put his
r a T; ,. I / e asked that his objections should be noted, so that if
rouble did ensue, he might not be held responsible, and begged me
to give very minute consideration to his proposal. His object was
to avoid conflict and discussion with the ‘Iraq Government as far as
possible and to let each Government attend to its own affairs.
I said that in matters affecting the nomad tribes on the borders I
was prepared to admit His Highness’ great knowledge and ex
perience, but his methods of dealing with them were not necessarily
possible of adoption by Governments which were differently situated.
His Majesty s Government and the ‘Iraq Government were both con
vinced that the principle recommended by His Highness could not
be admitted or enforced.
then asked him whether, in the event of an agreement based on
the principle which he desired being concluded, he would ask for the
return of the whole of the Nejd Shammar. Ibn Sa'ud replied that
the return to Nejd of the Shammar had previously been the subject
of correspondence with Sir Percy Cox, and it had been agreed that
they should be surrendered ; but this had never been done" Person-
ally, he had no wish for their return to Nejd, where they would
probably only create trouble—indeed, he would prefer that they
s ou e scn t further away—but they were a constant threat
to peace and that was why he wanted them handed over.
After further discussion on minor questions and hypotheses put
forward by Ibn Sa'ud, I observed that it was beyond the wit of men
to devise any instrument which could work successfully unless both
parties were prepared to do their best to co-operate. It was not my