سياسي خارجي ٤٠/١٠٧٠(٢) "نقل الرُزم السرية لوزارة الخارجية من وإلى القنصليات وغيرها في الخارج" [و‎‎١‎٥‎١] (٨٣٥/٣٠٢)

13
of non-discrimination. The question was raised by the Australian delegation
whether, after entering into a long-term contract to sell its produce at a given
price, a Government could, by means of quantitative restriction of imports,
protect its home market against the effects of any subsequent decline in world
prices. On this, the view was taken that, in these circumstances, the
Washington proposals would allow the imposition of prohibitions on private
^ trade to maintain a State trading monopoly, but it was felt that, if a monopoly
did not exist it would be inconsistent with the convention for quantitative
* restrictions to be imposed.
International Commercial Policy Organisation.
' 53. The Washington proposals on the question of the establishment of an
international commercial policy organisation differ little from the proposals
discussed with Dominion representatives in June 1943. The United Kingdom,
Dominion and Indian officials agree in general with the treatment of this subject
in the Washington proposals. (Section VII of Annex H.)
54. The United Kingdom, Dominion and Indian representatives have given
some attention to the question of the treatment of States which do not adhere
to the convention. It is generally agreed that, in the ordinary way, the benefits
of the convention should be denied to non-members, but that a member should
be permitted to make an agreement with a non-member, provided that the
non-member extended to all other members of the organisation the benefits which
it granted under such an agreement, and provided, moreover, that before the
agreement came into force, the international commercial policy organisation had
not considered the agreement objectionable, either generally or in its effects on any
member country. There is general support for a suggestion of the Canadian
representatives that, when tariff reductions and other benefits of the convention
enter into force, they should be extended to non-member countries for a stated
time to cover the period of notice generally required for the revocation of trade
treaties and most-favoured-nation arrangements, and that, after the expiry of
this period, the benefits (which in practice would be mainly tariff reductions)
« should be withdrawn from countries which have not adhered to the convention.
The Australian representatives, whilst not dissenting from these views, wish to
see which countries refuse to become members before deciding how non-members
should be treated.
i.
55. As a particular instance of the question of the treatment of non-adherent
States, the United Kingdom, Dominion and Indian representatives have explored,
in a tentative manner, what would be the economic results of the proposed rules
in the event of the failure of a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations
to adhere to the convention. It is recognised that this question also raises political
issues outside the scope of the present discussions. The results of denying to
non-adherent States the advantages of any tariff reductions under the multilateral
convention would depend mainly upon the nature of the formula for the reduction
of tariffs and upon the magnitude of the reductions. If preferential rates of
duty were left unchanged and the amount of the reduction in non-preferential
rates of duty were smaller than the existing preferential margins, any member
of the Commonwealth that did not adhere wmdd still receive from other members
of the Commonwealth more favourable treatment than the latter were giving
to foreign adhering States. If, on the other hand, the reduction in non-preferen-
tial rates of duty were greater than the existing preferential margins, a member
of the Commonwealth that did not adhere would receive from other Common
wealth countries less favourable treatment than the latter were giving to foreign
adhering States. Under the latter alternative, an ad hoc agreement could perhaps
be concluded with the non-adherent Commonwealth country on the lines
contemplated in paragraph 54 above.
Problems of Timing and of the Transitional Period.
56. During the course of the present discussions, United Kingdom,
Dominion and Indian officials have given a good deal of consideration to the
problems of the transitional period immediately following the war. They have
devoted some thought to the need for retaining various forms of trade restrictions
during this period, and to the question of the procedure and timetable for
bringing any commercial convention into force.
57. At the previous discussions in June 1943, it was suggested that many
countries would be obliged to retain control over their import trade immediately