سياسي خارجي ٤٠/١٠٧٠(٢) "نقل الرُزم السرية لوزارة الخارجية من وإلى القنصليات وغيرها في الخارج" [و‎‎١‎٨‎٧] (٨٣٥/٣٧٤)

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Agreement was signed. They pressed us with great persistence and spared no
emphasis in telling us that their difficulties in securing the tariff reductions
prescribed in the Article would be insuperable if the United Kingdom maintained
a position suggesting that the offer of a substantial cut m preference margins
was all that would be called for from us in any circumstances that could reason
ably be foreseen. They admitted our argument that tariff reductions and the
elimination of preferences were relative, but pressed us for a dehnite statement
ohat there was a degree of tariff reduction in return for which we should abolish
preferences. We could not regard this pressure as illegitimate as an enquiry
into the meaning of the final obligation under Article VII. We had among the
documents for our guidance a minute by Sir W. Malkin dated the
23rd December, 1941, of which the following are the first two sentences:
“ Imperial preference is certainly a ‘ form of discriminatory treatment ’ within
the meaning of the phrase in Article VII; consequently its ultimate
‘ elimination ’ forms part of the programme indicated in the draft article.” No
amount of emphasis on the language of the Article itself or of the telegram of
interpretation received by Mr. Winant from the State Department on the
16th December, 1941, as to the progressive nature of the action to be taken in
regard to tariffs and preferences could enable us to evade this ultimate issue
without exciting a most undesirable atmosphere of distrust. It was natural
that our opening gambit of offering a 50 per cent, cut in preference in return
for a 25 per cent, ceiling on tariffs, which we had put forward tentatively in
accordance with our instructions, should give rise to this pertinent question as
to our view of the ultimate obligation involved.
The time soon came to ensure that these related questions of tariffs and
preferences were placed in a better perspective. We told the Americans that we
had listened to a good deal about the difficulties for them in tariff reduction
and that it was at least of equal importance that we should explain to them
and that they should understand the difficulties for us in any radical downward
adjustment of preferences. We pointed out with suitable emphasis that the
Imperial preferential system had its justification in a special political relation
ship and referred to the anomaly of considering Imperial preferences as
peculiarly sinful, when the 100 per cent, preferences which the States of the
American Union enjoyed with each other were lauded as one of the principal
virtues. We added to these political considerations economic reasons for the
view that tariff preferences were to be regarded at least as no more obnoxious
than high tariff barriers themselves. We warned them that to press the argument
against Imperial preference as though these considerations were negligible would
only result in creating resistances and resentments, which might prevent the
realisation of progress in clearing the channels of trade which might otherwise
be within reach.
Our arguments appeared to have some effect. At later meetings the American
attack on preferences was conducted in a more sober and realistic atmosphere.
They admitted that they had no ultimate objection to token preferences which
did not have any substantial effect in diverting trade. They admitted that in
order to obtain the virtual abolition of preferences they would have to make
adequate reductions in their tariff, and that the difficult problem of determining
what degree of tariff reduction would be adequate for this purpose remained for
consideration at a later stage. Nevertheless we gained the definite impression
that an offer to halve preferential margins will, in the American view, be adequate
only to obtain a moderate reduction of their tariff; or, to be more precise, that
a reduction of the American tariff to a ceiling of 25 per cent, ad valorem —or a
reduction of corresponding severity—would cost us practically the whole of our
preferential margins. (The relevant Section of Annex A is II—see particularly
paragraph 1.)
11. On private occasions outside the meetings of the Committee itself we
had some informal talks with American officials on the subject of future
procedure. There is no tendency at all among the Americans to regard
commercial policy as a topic which can be successfully treated by vague
resolutions of an aspirational kind. Indeed, Mr. Hawkins said that in no
circumstances would he be a party to projecting the subject into international
discussion unless a concrete scheme had been prepared. The American officials
felt sufficiently encouraged with the progress that had been made to express the
hope that there would be a resumption of the conversations at some date early
next year. It would be idle to speculate upon the view which American Ministers
may take of the political feasibility of anything of the kind which is discussed