‎خارجي ١/٤٧/٥٠٠٠ "الوضع الفارسي: تقارير متنوعة" [ظ‎‎١‎٥‎٤] (٧٠٤/٣١٠)

should have a strong personality at the head of any
new Government which might be formed 0 I should indeed
regard a weak interim Government of the kind suggested
as an extremely dangerous, experiment which might well
lead to [gp 0 undec,] and not reform of the Constitution.
I am sure that His Majesty himself has no such
intention,, and it would clearly be unwise at this
stage even to hint at this possibility, but if I 'am
eventually obliged to do so, I should be glad to know
.that I am acting with your approvals
3, The Shah reverted later to the possibility of
retaining Qavam with an entirely different cabinet*
He foresaw that what he feels to be rising tide of
opposition to Qavom in the Ma jl:1s'might prevent this
and I am [? gp« omitted c ] he would have welcomed some
encouragement from me to dismiss him* Needless--to
say I did not give it,
h. The Shah also spoke of re-equipment of his
army which he is now inclined to think of as a. first
line of defence against a Soviet invasion of the Middle
East. I did my best to discourage this view and said
that I thought that re-equipment of the army ‘should be
directed primarily to ensuring the efficient maintenance
pf law and order in this comitr;/. His Majesty was in
some doubt whether equipment of the army with American
material should be paid for by the, Persian Government
or financed by a grant similar to that Accorded in,.the
case of Turkey and Greece,, It is clear that he would
like to obtain this material for nothing but is reluctant
to agree to any kind of American supervision of his
army* It seems to me however that ’it will make,little
difference politically who pays for any equipment that
may be supplied to Persia from. American sowraes G
Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Moscow
as my telegrams No c 111 and 131 respectively*
[Repeated to Washington and Moscow.]
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