مجموعة ٣٠/ ٢٢٤ "ترتيبات العملة في المشيخات العربية في الخليج الفارسي." [ظ‎‎٣‎٠] (١٥٧/٦٨)

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If tuese explsnetlone no le givendor* ^
eon*ideration tnen^e £7 Oeetowed on tumo in the past.
* 4 ™. t nii>£ 5 iied ttus idea of eataolishing the
(III) For so * i*** J of tiie <|ulf - x in the senee of
Indian rupee as t«e ® ttel e f id abandoned the proposal ••
making it legal tender) nut in official currency
being impracticable and tn eause a law to bo paisaed
we should hare to persuade ^SbeUhs to caus e> ^ ,, e
. th« Indian rupee in effect le»sal winae 4*14
t^^uch a “top we would be accepting heavy responalbilitlea.
^h© oeoele of the iheikhdorae are not sufiicie itlj
Tli6 people ui s. v «* aivAna leizal tencier status to
sophisticated to appreciate that hy giving ^
meiAR ruDee «e would toe doinp r.o .wre men
eet i'clishing the .seenr by which debtors settled *itu uhcA?
The oeoole of the dheikiidflM arc more, than lively to
^aad into*the action conferring legal tender x ^
rupee as carrying with it a guarantee oi
that might beset that currency, ne could not e^ny
ddeoTO responsibility for any action taken by p»di* in ^tptet to
the Indian rupee oi" detriunent to the Sheikhdoms* Toey '* 001 .
clearly holct h.G* responsible for haring imposed (which iu fact
it would euiount to) the use of the Indian rupee#
Moreover it would toe extre.iely anomalous tor h.fi0s-r.
to impose the use of a currency the control or w ^ el1 * n
another Government. The tJovelftiment of Innia could# 1 ^ 1 ^
change the re'iue of the Indian rupee and would do so in tue
interests oi* the Gulf States# but the Gulf st-uteb v'ouiu
accept the change whether it suited them or not and without the^r
opinions on the taatter Bought. In the event io-ilowing
estatolieumeat ch' the Indian rupee as the official currency 01 -ue
Gulf# would toe not a liUle smbarrnfcsed. i^ven more
disaetroua for the Gulf aiid even more eraDarrassi^ lor U*M*0#
would toe the withdrawal of India Iran ufce U ter ling Area. 1*1x18 is
unlikely hut the possibility cannot to© ruled out.
Finally# there la the risk, as pointed out toy the
Political Eesidant# that the Eeputolic of India *b new notes may
contain something offensive to Moslem eyes.
(IV) In view of all these considerations I came to the
conclusion that my recorffiaendation must be very definitely against
the taking of any further action to establish the Indian rupee as
the official currency for the Gulf (as distinct from accepting it,
as we do now# in payment for H.M.0. services in the Gulf^.
The question than was whether we should leave things as
they are and let the a*©rCii&ats and bankers worry things out for
themselves# or whether we should consider something more positive.
For much the same reasons as thoc^ which led me to advise against
doing anything further with the Xudlan rupee as the official
currency# 1 came to the conclusion that h.k.G. would toe fall! g
short oi its obligations to the Gulf states If it left currency
matters as they are. If anything happened to the Indian rupee,
sitaough not established as the od'ficial currency# ii• G• v.oaiJ. be
blamed toy the Gulf people. They would consider that h.k.G. iuid a
itioral responsibility to them and ought then to co^apenatite them £ov
any losses sustained.
i'f} It seemed deBiratolc# therefore to coasidei > so etalag
more objective altliough I appreciate that I exceeded my brief In
doxng so. It is clo&r that many people in the Gulf pot merely
Furcp^ans# are expecting sob*; change tout they hi ve no idoa
at the form it shoold take, ray thoughts on these question* v#ith
my recamiendstions are given in the following chapter.