ملف ٧٢٥١/١٩٢٠ الجزء ٣ "الجزيرة العربية: الوضع والسياسة؛ جدول أعمال اجتماعات اللجنة المشتركة بين الإدارات" [ظ‎‎٢‎٠‎٤] (٢٦٨/٤٥)

4
As no threat would in itself be sufficient to ensure a satisfactory attitude, some
other means must be found of establishing the influence we desire the other Powers to j
recognise^ ^ ^ tbe rulers w ; t h whom we were in intimate relations before the
war, with the exception of the Sheikh of Bahrein, the policy of the Government of
India has been to ensure a satisfactory attitude by offering financial support. Dunne f
the war the same principle was extended to the rulers whose co-operation against the f
Turks was desirable in the interests of the Allies. It is the method that was invariably
employed by the Turks themselves, and it is difficult to to see how any other method
can be effective. . . . ,
10. Jn the cnse of those rulers whose territories are open to attack by sea it may
perhaps be argued that no additional benefit beyond protection from such attack should
be looked for from His Majesty’s Government, and that the question of financial
assistance does not therefore arise. The deduction would be that Ibn Rashid is the
onlv ruler to whom it might be necessary to provide financial support to ensure his
carrying out his side of the bargain, since he is tbe only ruler whose territory does not
at any point touch the sea. There are, however, two reasons why this arbitrary
distinction would be difficult to carry out in practice.
The first is that, as will be seen from paragraph 11, three of the nine rulers whose
territory touches the sea are already in receipt of financial support from His Majesty s
Government—namely, the Sultan of Muscat, the Sultan of Sbehi and Mokalla and the
Sheikh of Koweit. Any proposal to stop subsidies to rulers whose territories touch
the sea would involve the cessation of pecuniary assistance to these three rulers and,
in the case of the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla, the abrogation of his treaty rights in so
far as they provide for a subsidy.
The second objection to the line of argument, which would result in the entire
cessation of subsidies to rulers whose territories touch the sea, is the fact that a
subsidy, however small, is regarded as a mark of special favour, and any discrimination
between one ruler and another, however logically it might be s pported, would
inevitably cause jealousy and friction. The same argument applies with even greater
force to any other attempt to discriminate between one gr<>un of rulers and another,
unless His Majesty’s Government adopt the definite policy of supporting one ruler and i
making all the others subordinate to him. This would involve the reconsideration of
the division of the peninsula into its ten natural areas, and would in any case be
exceedinglv difficult to carry out in view of the traditional reluctance of auv Arab ruler
to acknowledge the suzerainty of another. It would aUo involve an alteration of the
terms of the draft treaty by which His Majesty’s Government are to “guarantee
the independence of the rulers of Arabia.”
It is submitted that the only practical method of securing the influence which His
Majesty’s Government hope to deny to other Powers is by extending the principle of
financial support to all the independent rulers of Arabia.
11. Before discussing how this can best be done, it may be useful to summarise the '
present position :—
(1.1 Muscat. — The Sultan of Muscat was granted in 1861 an allowance of
86.400 rupees per annum from Indian revenues, and in 1911 he was granted a further
subsidy of 100,000 rupees per annum in connection with the agreement for the regula- j
tion of the arms traffic.
(2.) Hadramaut. — The Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla is at present in receipt of a
stipend of 60 rupees per mensem in accordance with the terms of the treaty of 1882.
In 1917 he was given a loan of 400,000 rupees, which he is gradually repaying, instal- i
ments of 15,000 having been credited in November 1919 and in March 1920.
(3.) Trucial Coast. —No subsidies are at present being pa d.
(4.) Ba/irem.—No subsidy.
(5.) Yemen. — The Imam Yaht/a is at present hostile to His Majestv s Government.
In the spring of this year he invaded the Aden protectorate and established his officials
among the more northerly tribes. Attempts were made to open negotiations with him,
but had to be abandoned, partly owing to the capture by local tribes of the mission
.sent to Sanaa, and partly owing to the fact that the Imam declined to recognise His
Majesty’s Government as having any special right to regulate the affairs of the Yemen.
One result of the negotiation of the present treaty with the principal Allied Powers
will be to determine the position of His Majesty’s Government vis-d vis the Imam, and
it is hoped that a treaty may be negotiated with him in tne near future. It has been
represented by His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo that it would probably be