ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [و‎‎٦‎٨] (٨٩٦/١٣٣)

l‘J. It might have been wise for the Persian Government to have destroyed
Dost Muhamed, for should stable Government be shaken the death of the
present Prime Minister would probably throw Persia back into anarchy.
Dost Muhamed will rise again, but such has not been the policy they have
selected and indeed naturally their policy must be based on the hope of
stability.
13. In any case with an accredited Persian Governor we can demand the
reparation we desire, but I am of the opinion that should such an official
materialise we shall immediately need the services of a consular officer in
Persian Baluchistan.
14. I am sending a copy of this letter to His Majesty’s Minister at
Tehran, to the Hon’ble the Agent ‘ to the Governor-General in Baluchistan
and to the Consuls of Kerman and Seistan.
36
No. 443, dated Quetta, the 15th March 1924.
From—The Hobble Mr. F. W. Johnston, C.S.T., C.L.E., Agent to the
Governor-General and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan,
To—E. B, Howell, Esq., C.S.I., C.I.E., Foreign Secretary to the Government
of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.
Sarkad Affairs,
I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of
India, a copy of a letter No. 7-B., dated the 9th March 1924, from Lieutenant-
Colonel Keyes reporting the formal rendition of the Sarhad to the Persians.
The British troops have been successfully withdrawn to Mirjawa without any
incident of any kind and the successful termination of this somewhat delicate
business, which was by no means devoid of elements of danger, reflects the
greatest credit on Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes and his Deputy Liaison Officer,
Major Dennys, for the way in which they have handled the matter.
2. I have already in previous correspondence expressed the fear that lack
of co-ordination and independent, and possibly opposing, action from the
Kerman side might do much to nullify the good start which had been made
under the capable and forceful leadership of the Salar Amjad.
I should doubt the permanence, unless it was backed by continual and
genuine force, of any arrangement come to with one so untrusworthy
and so generally distrusted as Dost Muhamed Khan, and I am in entire
agreement with what Colonel Keyes has said in paragraph 18 of his
letter.
3. As regards the Kekis and Ismailzais mentioned in paragraph 16 of
Colonel Keyes’ letter, I would endorse the hope expressed at the end of that
paragraph that His Majesty’s Minister may find occasion to use his good’
offices on their behalf.
As a portion of the Kekis have equal claims to British and to Persian
nationality, it will be possible to provide service for a number of these in the
new scheme for defending this portion of the frontier and, if no objection is
taken by the Persians, to include in that force also some of the Ismailzais.
4. As regards withdrawal completely from Persia of British troops, I agree
with Colonel Keyes in seeing no objection to the withdrawal of these from
Duzdap or Mirjawa as soon as they have completed their arrangements, as
regards removal of stores, etc. There is now no need to retain troops at
Duzdap which is the headquarters of an efficient Persian force. Bor defence
on this side of the border a small force is required in the vicinity of Mirjawa
and owing to water difficulties no suitable place can be found outside Mirjawa
itself. The Persians make no objection to the locating of a force. in Mirjawa
for the time being and the question of permanent location, which is inseparable
from that of the railway, can more suitably be taken up with that of the
junction of the British and Persian portions of the railway. As Colonel Keyes
has stated, the recent tribal contingents, which had to be temporarily added