ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [و‎‎١‎٩‎٣] (٨٩٦/٣٨٣)

British and Indian Governments, subject to the adoption of measures which
they regard as satisfactory to ensure proper control of the Sarhad by the
Persian authorities, are prepared to cede the ownership of the Mirjawa-Duzdap
railway to Persia free of cost, but on certain conditions”.
Considerable correspondence which it is not necessary to record in detail
ensued between the Secretary of State xor India and the Government of India,
and between the Government of India and Tehran regarding minor political
safeguards to be required of Persia, means of securing the financial interests
of the Imperial Government at wh^se expense the Mirjawa-Duzdap section
was built, and methods for encouraging the development of the line after its
transference to Persia. On 2nd May 1923 (Serial No. 19) the Secretary of
State addressed the Foreign Office concurring in the line Sir P. Loraine proposed
„ o ^ „ totakefor negotiating with the Persian
—4 ( .-413-‘07*‘ 4). Government the two questions of the
cession of the Mirjawa-Duzdap line to Persia and the assumption by Persian
authorities of control of the Sarhad ; offering the Treasury joint ownership
ot the (British) residue of the line, the property of the Government of India ;
and suggesting a basis for interesting British capitalists in the development
of the line in Persia.
The Foreign Office consulted the Treasury on the second of these main
points and on 22nd August the Treasury
‘ replied (Enclo. to Serial No. 77) rejecting
the offer of joint ownership in the Nushki-Mirjawa line, and suggesting
instead that the Government of India should purchase the Imperial Govern
ment’s rights in the Mirjawa-Duzdap line for its gross break up value
Ps. >/75 lakhs. A similar suggestion having already been considered and
rejected by the Government of India, the Secretary of State is in consultation
with the latter as to any compromise that can be offered to the Treasury.
In the meantime a state of very considerable disorder had developed on
the southern sections of the Anglo-Persian Frontier in Baluchistan, owing
Government of India letter No. 519-F., to the entire absence of any control in
Both August. (Serial No. 87.) Persian Mekran by the Persian Govern
ment, the assumption of power by Dost Muhammad Khan of Bampur, and
Government of India telegram I211-S., 4th raids carried out or instigated by him
October. (Serial No. 86.) into British territory. The unrest in
Mekran affected the tribes of the Sarhad further north who raided into
Kharan.
The Government of India took occasion to point out that control of the
Sarhad could never be effective without control of Mekran and urged that
negotiations over the Duzdap railway should be set in hand without delay and
that satisfactory assurances regarding the remssertion of the Persian Govern
ment’s authority in the “ whole of Persian Baluchistan and not merely in the
Sarhad should be made one of the conditions precedent to our surrendei' of the
Persian section of the railway”. They went further and suggested that the
Government of India telegram 1220-S., 8tii Persian Government should_ be warned
October.. (Serial No. 88.) that failure to take effective steps to
control the Sarhad and refusal of permission to allow the Government of
India’s officers to exercise control in the interim, especially in the matter of
dealing with Dost Muhammad, mjght force them to suspend the rail-service to
Duzdap, with the result of diminishing the Persian Government’s customs
revenue.
On 12th October the Secretary of State addressed the Foreign Office
(Serial No. 119), forwarding the papers
P.-3838 (E.-io 100-207- 4). cited in the two preceding paragraphs,
and emphasizing the need of adding to the proposed conditions for the cession
to the Persian Government of the railway a demand for the efficient establish
ment of its authority in Persian Mekran. In this connection it was suggested
that the Government of India’s proposals of 1917 might furnish, despite the
changed conditions, an indication of the form of authority that seemed most
likely to produce results ; and emphasis was also laid on the need of looking
beyond the requirements of the immediate present, lest by a false start Persia
should set up an ineffective form of control.