ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎٣] (٨٩٦/٤٤٤)

78
Bam and Narmashir with a strong garrison to prevent raids and then
£%-• •»““ d jeb:S jis-ja
our assistance.
15 At the same time the Shaukat from Seistan is moving and has pro
posed to garrison Khwash.
16 The Hon’ble the Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan has
said that he cannot control this territory and the tribes we now subsidise if
Persian troops and officials are in occupation of the country. The truth of
this is self-evident. Our object is to avoid the present anomalous position
of our occupying a portion of Persian territory.
17 Thus the .question resolves itself into a simple matter; if the
Persians can take such steps as will guarantee the safety of the Railway we
should leave the 'Sarhad to them and evacuate—if they cannot we must con
tinue as we are till they can so do.
18. The matter then turns on the preparations the Persians can make.
19. But the Hon’ble the Agent to the Governor General has stated that
if the Persians wish to make a gesture from this side to show Dost Muham
mad that it would be wisest for him to come in, the objections taken to their
intrusion on the Sarhad would not maintain provided this gesture does not
affect the Sarhad, i.e., provided they do not advance beyond the Duzdap-
Shorgaz line which is the line of the proposed new short route to Kerman.
20. While we cannot tell the Persians they cannot advance in their own
country we can tell them that if they desire to advance beyond a certain route
we will withdraw but that in that case they must guarantee us the safety
of the railway.
! 21. It will be seen that I consider the Sarhad and Persian Baluchistan
to be two different questions, in their essential points. Though Dost
Muhammad and the tribes are in close touch and assist each other in their
{ raiding parties though their conditions act and react upon each other their
fundamental conditions of Government are separate. The Sarhad might be
ruled from Bampur. Bampur could not be ruled from the Sarhad.
22. Any further report must wait till we see what preparations the
Persians are able to make and this will depend very largely upon the political
. situation at Tehran.
23. The question as to whether the Consul for Southern Baluchistan
should be appointed immediately to take the place of the Political Agent,
Chagai, if the Persians assume control of the Sarhad, is one which concerns
the Hon’ble the Agent to the Governor General most but I would state my
opinion that if all subsidies are withdrawn suddenly it will not assist the
Persians in maintaining the control we desire while the payment of these
subsidies as a life measure would probably be cheaper than the present
system; payments could easily be made through a Consular Officer.
24. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Hon’ble the Agent to the
Governor General in Baluchistan and forward 3 copies of this letter with the
request that a copy may be forwarded to His Hritannic Majesty’s Minister
in lehran. The post from Kerman to Tehran take 26 days.
f
133
No. 2.-Q., dated Quetta, the 21st November 1923.
hrom—B. J. Gould, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S., His Britannic Majesty’s Consul for
beistan and Kain,
To Hie Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and
1 ohtical Department, Delhi.
nsiaoLisnment of Persian Control in Persian Baluchistan,
representation in that district.
q J" ac 4 ,^ a / ? c f ) V]th / ^ lle . directions conveved in vour telegrams No. 1266-
■ ot tlie 20th 0ct ober (Serial No. 96), and No. 1283-S. of the 23rd October