ملف ١٩١٦/١٣٢٣ الجزء ١ "بلوشستان: الأوضاع المضطربة على الحدود الأنجلو فارسية. الإدارة المستقبلية لولايات مكران وسرهد وقلات" [و‎‎٣‎٦‎٢] (٨٩٦/٧٢١)

now, and the agreement contracted by the Makran Mission in 1916 should prove our
bonafides in the matter of Southern Baluchistan.
In this agreement Behram Khan, Dost Muhammad’s predecessor, and Ali
Muhammad, Dost Muhammad’s father, undertook to receive a Persian Governor in
Bampur and pay revenue.
Owing to other political considerations Persia was not informed of these efforts
made on her behalf ; but I suggest that she should now be informed as a proof of
our correct attitude in the past.
26. Cost of co-operation .-—I believe that co-operation similar to that of 1901-02
would not only meet with success, but would encounter no opposition. It would
cost us far less than the touring expenses of the Political Agent did in those days, as
the only regular technical details necessary to add to the detachment of the Makran
Levy Corps, which with his usual military guard would suffice for this duty, would
cost a very small sum to transport.
27. Necessity for co-ordination .—Without our co-operation I am convinced
Persia must fail, but it is essential for such co-operation to succeed, that British
and Persian action should be properly co-ordinated. For this purpose it is very
desirable that the Political Agent should meet the Persian Governor before the latter
embarks on his enterprise.
28. Steps to restore confidence in Kalat. —So much for our action across the
border. Not less important is our action within our own borders. We are not
only bound by treaty to assist the Khan in protecting this frontier, but we have of
necessity in late years assumed more and more the sole responsibility, and, in
going over the Khan’s head in all matters in Makran, have repeated the pre-
Sandeman policy of ignoring the Confederacy.
I believe that the efforts now being made to restore the authority of Sardars
can be made to bear immediate fruit by calling on them to bear their old responsibi
lities as well as enjoy their privileges. In former days the Khans controlled Makran
by “ ghamkashi ” or calling out tribal contingents, the quotas of which were
fixed by custom. Many of the tribal Sardars, in expressing their gratitude for the
restoration of their old powers, have volunteered to produce their quotas whenever
and wherever required. There has even been a spontaneous revival of recruiting
for the Regular Army.
To organize a tribal reserve for the Frontier Levy Corps on the “ ghamkashi ”
system would not only relieve lis of the necessity of keeping regular troops locked
up, but, by interesting the tribes in the defence of the Kalat frontier, would enlist
their sympathies and render them less susceptible to hostile propaganda.
I should propose to test the tribal reserve system by garrisoning the frontier
posts with tribal contingents during the absence of a portion of the Makran Levy
Corps escorting the Political Agent.
29. One Levy Corps for whole Should the policy of the Government
of India admit of it, I consider that the most effective defence of the frontier would
be attained by entrusting it to one Levy Corps from Koh-i-Malik Siah to the sea—
with its Head Quarters at Panjgur. The communication for its posts from rear
to front are now completed, and the lateral communcation from Pasni to Koh-i-
Malik Siah should be completed in a few months. Tribal reserves could be brought
up along 4 lines—to the Kech valley from Jhalawan by motor road, to Panjgur
from Sarawan also by motor road. To Ladgasht from Kharan by camel track,
and to the Mirjawa—Koh-i-Malik Siah section from Dalbandin and Nushki by
rail—if the rail remains—otherwise by the motor road which can be easily restored.
To effect this it would only be necessary to add to the Makran Levy Corps
a British officer and sufficient men to keep mobile detachments at Sohtagan,
Kundi, Juzzak and Kachha and posts representing British authority at Saindak
and Robat. The cost of these would be less than what is now spent on levies in
Chagai and the Sarhad. This would enable the battalion now dispersed in small
detachments over 400 miles to be withdrawn to Nushki or Quetta.