ملف ١٩٢٤/١٧٠٧ "الجزيره العربية - تقارير عن الوضع في جدة. (١٩٢٤-١٩٣٠)" [و‎‎٣‎٨‎١] (٨٩٨/٧٦٦)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic
Majesty's Government.]
EASTERN (Arabia).
CONFIDENTIAL.
[February 13, 1925.]
Section 1 .
[E 883/10/91]
No. 1.
Consul Bullard to Mr. Auston Chamborlaiu.—(yRocoivcd Fsbrunry 13 )
(No. 6. Secret.)
^ r ’ Jeddah, January 1^, 1^2^.
I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering: the period the
9th to 19th January.
2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt
Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut'’X^OTmafShs), Aden,
Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muskat.
I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.
(Secret.)
Enclosure 1 in No. 1.
Report for the Period January 9-19, 1925.
IT is expected that Ibn Saud will make a night attack within the next few days,
towards the time of the new moon. His forces have raided to within a mile or two
of Jeddah, without encountering any resistance from the Hedjaz tribes, and are
now encamped at places some 6 or 8 miles from the town. The Jeddah defences
consist of a semi-circular barbed-wire ifence (it can hardly be described as an
entanglement), which must be about 3 miles in length. To defend this, there are—
apart from orderlies, stretcher-bearers, &e.—about 700 men. These are armed with
at least four different kinds of rifle : British, German, Russian and Austrian; and
there is so little ammunition for the British rifles (some 200 in number) that they
would soon be useless. Few of the officers and still fewer of the men are Hedjazis,
and the officers are by no means united; the Arabs hate the Turks, the Turks despise
the Arabs, and of the Arabs many are politicians rather than fighting men. Some
200 men (said to be Druses, most of them) arrived from Akaba a few days ago, but
it is too late for them to be turned into an integral part of the Hedjaz army. The
artillery will be useless against a night attack by scattered forces, and even in
daylight it is ineffective, as the gunners have not yet learned how to prevent the shell
from bursting high in the air.
2. It would seem that even if the Hedjaz Government were not defeated in
battle, they must collapse very soon for lack of funds. They have been trying to
V recover from General Sir Foster Newland at least part of the sums paid to him for
the purchase of munitions in England, but so far without success. King Hussein is
known to have large sums put aside, but he supplies his son with nothing but advice
not to give Ibn Saud an exaggerated sense of his importance by condescending to
negotiate with him. Meanwhile, the Hedjaz Government seems to exist precariously
on forced loans, which produce £10,000 or so every few weeks. The troops—mostly
Palestinians, to whom the attraction offered was good pay—have not been paid for
the Arabic month, which ended over three weeks ago.
3. The six Germans whose arrival was reported, left on the 9th January. They
seem to have been engaged on silly orders from the Amir Abdullah, and to have been
promised salary at a rate far beyond the Hedjaz Government’s power to pay. They
refused to be beaten down, and left in a body. One was an officer, the others n.c.o.’s;
two were for armoured cars, two for artillery and two for infantry. It appears
that armoured cars and munitions were ordered in Germany, but the export was
forbidden by the German Government because the buyers tried to get them out
under a false name. After this, attempts seem to have been made, through an Arab
in Trieste, to purchase armoured cars and aeroplane bombs in Italy, with what
success is not known.
4. For several days two aeroplanes went up every day. They dropped 1 bombs
on several occasions, but the main effect of their flights has been to make the Hedjaz
[864 n—1]
B