"إضافات إلى دليل بلاد فارس، المجلدات II إلى IV." [و‎‎٥‎٢] (٣٧٠/١٠٣)

2 o
improved the quality by inducing the peasant to grow American seed, though
owing to the extra labour and care it demands, it has not as yet found much
favour with the cultivator. The total export does not exceed 30,000 pounds
though this only represents a part of the outturn for much is locally consum
ed in the manuiacture of inferior goods for the nomads.
. Strategical.—\n considering Azerbaijan from a strategical point of
view, in the light of an advance of hostile troops from the north onlv that
portion of the country between the Kara Dagh and Mount Ararat’ need come
into question. The Kara Dagh mountains limit the field of operations
presenting for all practical purposes an impassable barrier to the movements of
troops on that side. The objective of a hostile force would be Tabriz and
Urumia T he former, the capital of the province, the latter, the richest district
in Azarbaijau, the possession of which would mean that of all the lake districts’
probably as far south as Sakiz. To reach these places roads must
be taken which necessarily pass by Marand and Khoi, the only points where
the Mesho Dagh is pierced by good roads. These are the vital points, and any
scheme of defence must take both into consideration. Between Marand and
Khoi stretches the lofty wall of the Mesho Dagh. The ri^ht flank rests
on the Kara Dagh, the left flank on the Averain Dagh and behind, as an
inner line of communication protected by the mountains runs the excellent
lake road from Salmas to Tabriz. The mountains behind Marand and Khoi
lend themselves naturally to defence ; strongly fortified positions should be
established there, supported from Tabriz and Urumia by a well equipped and
mobile force. As regards the feasibility of an advance from the north
troops could move from the Aras valley with the greatest ease. Supplies can
be found in plenty in Karaziadin, the Zul plateau and Maku, whilst the
corn-growing district of Nakjivan and Erivan is within reach. The people
of the north-west would perforce assist the invaders and all their supplies
would be at their disposal, at the same time, given the above conditions and
a good staff, the northern provinces could hold their own with confidence
and every chance of success. Unfortunately these conditions do not exist.
The war strength of the province is supposed to consist of 26 Infantry
regiments, of which generally 2 or 3 are detached on foreign service in
Tehran. The rest are in garrison, or on leave at home. The 26 regiments
however, only exist on paper, and at least 30 per cent, should be deducted
for absentees. The system of payment accounts for the deficiency. The
garrisons of Tabriz and Khoi are placed at 2 | and 1 regiment of Infantry res
pectively, besides a small force of Artillery and Cavalry, but even these garri
sons are not maintained up to strength. During the winter of l&Qi Tabriz
had just enough infantry to furnish the police guards, about 4-00 men, and
Khoi had 150 men for police duties. The guns were carefully stored’ and
never taken out, except to fire a salute for the Governor. The reduction of
the garrisons would not be of much moment could the troops be rapidly
mobilized; but this is not the case. In the spring of I89i orders were
issued by the Wali Ahd for the assemblage of 6,000 men of all arms for a
camp of exercise at Maragha, 3 or 4 months’ notice was given, yet 2 regi
ments were absent altogether.^ The arms and equipment also are not such
as would stand any strain. I visited the arsenals of Tabriz and Khoi and
calculate roughly on 7,000 Werndl and 4,000 other breech-loaders, as available
on an emergency (1,500 Werndl and 1,000 other weapons were stored at,
Khoi) of ball ammunition there might be 200 rounds per rifle.