"إضافات إلى دليل بلاد فارس، المجلدات II إلى IV." [ظ‎‎٥‎٢] (٣٧٠/١٠٤)

There is only one force of any real consequence in Azarbaijan viz., that
of the chief of Maku, and this would not he rendered available for the de
fence of the country. The chief disposes of an irregular body of foot and horse
of 7,000 men, all well armed with breech-loaders and fairly supplied. Ten
days' warning would be sufficient in all probability to collect a body of 5,000
men. Premising that the chief has little desire to see his wings dipt by
Russia, he would throw in his lot with the stronger power. As matters now
stand he could seize the Urumia districts, and even the capital itself, before
the Government could organize and equip a force strong enough to resist
him. 0 ”
The Kurdistan tribes are a source of weakness. They are without
cohesion, independent and ill-inclined towards the Wali Ahd, at the first
sign of disorder they would rise to plunder and rob the province indiscri
minately.
A Russian advance would probably be on the following lines :
Khoi and Urumia could be seized within a few days of crossing the
border, the people meanwhile looking on with passive acquiescence. The*news
of the occupation of Khoi, the possession of which is regarded as equivalent to
the possession of Azarbaijan, would be the signal for a bloodthirsty massacre
of the official classes by the mob at Tabriz. Russian troops would shortly
enter the capital, welcomed as friends and protectors.
The occupation by Russia of Azarbiijan and the Urumia districts will
tPersian Guift give her the command of two important roads leading
into Turkey, one by Kotur to Van, the other by Bosh
Kala to Mosul, and so place her eventually in a favourable position towards
working her way by the Tigris valley to the Persian Gulf. In Urumia she
has a base for further advance south to Karmanshah, where once established
she holds all those eastern outlets to the Kurdistan lulls in which she is
likely to be interested for a final move down to the Persian Gulf. Azarbaijan
will also furnish her with men, perhaps second to none in Asia in endurance
and pluck. A better soldier than the Turk will be difficult to find, and led
and disciplined by Europeans, bis undeniable soldierly qualities will ’for the
first time have scope.
North-western Azarbaijan impinging as it does on the Bayazid and
(Turkey) X an distl ' icts > has always had much infercst for Turkev,
10 the present state of the country this importance'is
much exaggerated. Maku alone has the power to aim a blow and her power
is limited. The action of Timur Pasha Khan during the last war has led
Turkey to regard this border with suspicion for the chief not only assisted
Russia with supplies, but assembled a force of 2,000 men on the Bayazid
frontier, and successfully prevented Turkish Kurds from laying waste the
Aras valley.
In the case of war with Russia, Turkey will probably not hold
Bayazid; the place is too isolated and occupies no strategic position to
make it worth any great effort. Bayazid evacuated, the seat of war is too
distant from Maku to make her a factor in the final issue. In the event of
success to the Turks Maku would again come in question. From Bayazid the
country is open, and disciplined Turkish troops would easily subdue the undis
ciplined hordes of Timur Pasha Khan ; Maku taken they could over-run all the
rich district of the Aras valley. As regards the so-called regular army of