الانسحاب المقترح للقوات البريطانية من مورار وقاليور [و‎‎١‎٠‎٣] (٣٢/٢٣)

CL
7
GWALIOR.
I deeply regret that His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief and the Financial
Member of Council dissent so strongly
from the opinions of their colleagues in
this most important matter. I proposed
this change, because I believe that our pre
sent attitude towards Scindia himself is one
of unmerited suspicion and distrust; that
our remaining at Gwalior is a political
mistake ; that our military position is in
secure ; that our soldiers’ lives are unneces
sarily sacrificed ; that our treaty obligations
can be better fulfilled in a different way ;
that endless expense must be incurred; and
that' Gwalior, as it is, forms one of the
weak points in our Fmpire.
Till 1864 Gwalior was never considered
an obligatory point, or one that it was
thought desirable to occupy permanently
with European Troops. The action then
taken was, in my opinion, a reversal of not
only what was intended but promised. The
policy which I recommend is a partial re
currence to that which has for years been
pursued.
The idea that Scindia cannot stand alone
safely without a large subsidiary force of
Eritish troops at Morar is, I believe, not
founded on fact, and is opposed to the
opinions of our present Political Officers.
It is assumed that if my proposal is car
ried out, it will affect the position of the
ceded territories, and necessitate a revision
of treaties. I,have stated exactly the
reverse.
If any such suggestion is made on tne
Maharajah’s part, the negociation would
instantly be closed, and things would be
left as they are. If a treaty were effected
nn article would be inserted therein, laying