"تقارير إدارية ١٩٠٥-١٩١٠" [ظ‎‎٢‎٥‎١] (٦١٦/٥٠٧)

2
ADMINISTRATION REPORT OF THE PERSIAN GULF
Everything hung upon the question of finance. Without money, the Cen
tral Government was powerless to take any step^ to improve the situation.
The two allied Powers were fTmck faci$ ready to provide the necessary ad
vance or loan, but were naturally unwilling to do so without proper safeguards
for the regulation of its expenditure; while the Persian Government, badly
as she needed the funds, refused to concede to the reasonable stipulations of
the two Governments. The negotiations, dragged on month after month, the
numerous other questions which hinged on the settlement, of this one, remain
ing in a state of suspension.
Meanwhile, in the south, the outlook continued to go from bad to worse.
The local authorities at Shiraz had fail-
Fars and Southern Persia. ^ ^ ^ any punitive action in connec .
tion with the attack on the Russian Consul-General's party, in the preceding
November, and the tribe which had been responsible for it, the Boir Ahmecii
section of the Kuhgelu, had gained dangerous prestige by their successful and
unpunished attack. His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz considered that the only
remedy would be a British punitive expedition; but this departure from our
policy of non-intervention did not commend itself to higher authority, who
intimated that the intervention of an Indian force was in no way contem
plated. It was recognised, however, that the trade route question had now
assumed serious urgency. The Kazerun route had been closed altogether
since the attack on the Russian caravan, and the Sowlet-ud-Dowleh, Kashgai,
had endeavoured to force traffic; on to the Jirreh route; but this alternative
was greatly objected to by the commercial community, both Persian and Eng
lish, as being devoid of telegraph or caravanserais or adequate arrangements
for fodder, and also because the latter part of the route, through Tangistan,
was outside the sphere of which the Sowlet could guarantee the security.
Ultimately, however, the Central Government, having taken responsibility for
the Jirreh route, we were obliged to accept it.
In February, the situation was complicated by the intensity of the jeal
ousy existing between the Chiefs of' the rival Bakhtiari and Kashgai tribes,
and indeed from the general uneasiness; prevailing among local potentates in
the south in respect to the designs and ambitions of the Sardar-i-Assad, Bakh
tiari. Up to now, at all events as far as the south is concerned, the Chiefs of
the great tribes had always restricted their ambitions to the leadership of
their tribal councils and the promotion of tribal interests, locally. Partici
pation in the administrative government of Persia had been regarded as a
function foreign to the role of a tribal Chief. So long as the part the Sardar-
i-Assad was playing appeared to his compeers to be disinterested and merely
assumed in order to assist in the task of relieving the peasantry of Persia
from the intolerable yoke of despotism under which they laboured, the pro
ceedings of the Bakhtiari Chief were regarded with passive, if not demon
strative, good will. But when it was seen that the Sardar-i-Assad was
gradually establishing Bakhtiari domination not only at Tehran, but also^ at
the provincial centres in the south, and was believed to be using his position
to pull the strings of tribal interest at the Capital, he became the object of
the greatest apprehension both to the Kashgai and to the Shaikh of Moham-
merah; the former, intensely jealous of the rise of Bakhtiari power, and the
latter being possessed by the instinctive fear that, having cleared the field by
reducing the Kashgai, the Bakhtiari would turn their attention to himself.
It was useless to advise the Shaikh to maintain an independent attitude and
stand, aloof from exotic politics. He however replied that this was no ques
tion of foreign politics, but a prospect which menaced the security and well-
being of himself and his territory to their very foundations. " If you cannot
guarantee me against the results of Bakhtiari policy as pursued by the Sardar-
i-Assad from the Capital," he said, " you must leave me to forestall or insure
myself against the dangers ahead, in my own way." Such assurances as the
Shaikh needed were difficult to give, and the Shaikh's own dispositions for
safeguarding himself, included the formation of a league between himself, the
Sowlet-ud-Dowleh, Kashgai, and the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh, providing for
ostensibly concerted action between the three in the event of their interests