"ملف 61/14 II (D 46) العلاقات بين نجد والعراق" [ظ‎‎٧] (٤٦٦/٢٥)

the Christian Powers. It is most unlikely that, with this burden to bear, confused
by a worthless and ever-changing entourage, Ibn Saud is himself meditating bringing
help to the Syrian Nationalists, as the French seemed to fear some months ago, or is
eager to measure his strength with that of the Imam Yahya.
6. There is confirmation of this in a conversation which a close friend of
Ibn Saud and a man of moderate opinions had a day or two ago with a member of
the staff of this agency. Ibn Saud, this informant said, had no illusions about
affairs in the Arab peninsula. Between its sovereigns no fundamental harmony was
possible, for it was their nature each to seize any opportunity of crushing another.
But Ibn Saud did not view the rumours about the Imam's hostile intentions towards
him with much concern. Not one of the Arab princes was at liberty, or had the
power to' attack another. The Imam, for example, had internal troubles in the
Yemen, where rivals were working against him. Two of the Zeidi sheikhs sub
ordinate to him were, one openly, one secretly, aspiring to the imamate, and these
pretenders were attempting to induce Ibn Saud to help them; apart from that, some
of the Zeidi tribes were refractory. Again, the Imam had the British Government
against him. He had the Idrisi still to count with. The Idnsi was not dead, he
had fighting men still at his call, and if he could be helped with arms and ammunition
he could still give the Imam something to ponder over. Lastly, the Imam was so
miserly that he would think twice before pouring out his gold to no purpose.
7. There may have been an indirect appeal in this conversation. However,
its chief importance is that, in conjunction with the statement made to von Weisl, it
provides a basis for building up a theory of Ibn Saud s attitude towards the Imam.
That attitude might very reasonably be as follows : Ibn Saud has no particular
sympathy for the Imam, and feels that the Imam is not particularly friendly to
himself. Some day it may come to a trial of strength between them. If a connict
came, Ibn Saud is in quite as good a position as his rival. Each has worries at
home which should make for peace. But if the Imam wants to throw down a
challenge, let him try to absorb what is left of Asir. Should he take that line, the
present policy of indifference assumed by Ibn Saud might have to be revised. Let
the Imam think well over his situation before antagonising the British on one side
and Ibn Saud on the other.
8. Meanwhile, it is reported that 2,000 troops have been sent recently to the
southern frontier posts. But, as if to prove that he has no hostile intention at
present against the Imam, Ibn Saud has gone on his long-promised tour to Medina,
for which he professes a love " like that of the Prophet. ' His Majesty seems to
dislike heartily the climate of Mecca and Jeddah, and his remarks suggest nostalgia
for the drier air of the desert uplands of Nejd. He spent a week m Jeddah on
the way, and it is considered here that, now the King has finally gone, his absence
will be a long one. He himself speaks of an absence of some months. After his
stay in Medina, he may extend his tour to Nejd and perhaps Riyadh, which he has
not seen for a year and a half.
9. On contact with Ibn Saud it is impossible not to admire the King's fairness,
his shrewdness and his frank simplicity. The pity is that he has not found
counsellors to help him in a task of government for which one man alone is physically
incapable. Personal greed and private jealousies are no less present round Ibn Saud
than they were round King Ali. I have mentioned this fact at this point because
it may possibly have a bearing on His Majesty's momentary attitude towards Iraq
and Transjordan. Against both he expresses himself in terms of irritation. He
seems at present to feel that he got the worst of the Bahra and Hadda Agreements
and that they fetter him, while they have not reduced trouble on the frontiers. As
far as raiding during the last six months goes, he feels that his tribesmen are on the
credit side, and claims that if he had not restrained them they would have balanced
the account long ago.
10. He appears to have been specially disappointed by the break-up of the
conference at Ma'an between his representative and those of Transjordan, to which
reference was made in the last Jeddah report, paragraph 13. Indeed, the failure
of that meeting seems momentarily to have spoilt the pitch for future meetings of
the Hadda tribunal, which was founded to settle such disputes. However, when it
has been made clear to the King that the failure of the meeting w T as entirely due to
the preposterous behaviour of two persons who attended as semi-official Nejd
delegates, his faith in tribunals may revive. The present task of this agency will be
to reassure him that the British officials in Transjordan take the tribunal as a serious
matter, and will not brook external interferences with its proceedings.