"ملخص لمراسلات تتعلق بشؤون الخليج الفارسي، ١٨٠١-١٨٥٣" [و‎‎٩‎٠] (٣٤٤/١٧٩)

Part V—Chap. XXXVI.
159
87. It is therefore of importance both for the interest of His Highness himself, and
for the safety of the Gulf, that he should, if possible, a friend with this Chief, but such are the
effects of an ancient feud, inflamed by more recent personal animosities, on both sides that it
is not to be expected they will refrain from hostilities; and I fear His Highness was inclined to
foment dissension amongst the tribes against the Sultan.
88. Sheikh Rashid bin Humid of Ejman is, as noticed in the 8th paragraph of this
letter, at war with Sultan bin Suggur. The ostensible cause is a quarrel between two branches
of Beni Nara trii'C, one of which is subject to Rashid bin Humid, and the other disputes
his authority, and is supported by Sultan bin Sug^ur and the Jawasmis; while the Imaum
assists Rashid. I suspect however that the real cause is that Rashid, who was a notorious
pirate, and the friend of Kama bin Jabir, after acknowledging: the supremacy of Sultan bin
Niggur, has lately disclaimed it; and is either encouraged, or was originally instigated, by
the Imaum of Mascat.
39. Sultan bin Suiigur is, as I have before observed, recognized as the superior from
Ramss to Sharga excepdng at Ejman. This supremacy is of a very indefinite description and
is in fact little more than nominal, since Sultan bin Suggur has certainly very little direct
authority over them, and is unable to control their actions ; indeed I doubt if the power of any
Sheikh was absolute even in his own tribe. The Chiefs are elected by their own tribes, but
Sulfcan bin Suggur seems to have some power in influencing their choice, although he could
not impose a Sheikh upon them against their will; they seem in fact to be independent in
respect to their own tribes, but acknowledge a general allegiance to Sultan as the head of a
superior tribe. They all declared themselves responsible to us for the observance of the treaty
in so far as regarded their own ports, and yet on the paper which I have submitted, they
acknowledge an entire dependence on Sultan bin Suggur, who has accordingly been in the
habit of procuring all their passes, and in fact of transacting everything for them with
Colonel Kennett. 1 cannot doubt the authority of this document because I compared the
seal with those affixed to Sir William Keir treaty; but it seemed to be of little avail, since one
of the Chiefs had already denied it, and the rest seem to be cnly even nominally bound to
it; and I never even heard of its existence until I reached Sharga.
40. Sultan bin Suggur is ambitious of reducing the tribes to complete and absolute sub
jection and to be considered answerable for the whole of the coast. It is impossible for us to
recognize his authority any further than it is obeyed by the other Chiefs, nor can we lend the
influence of our name in any way to aid his views; at the same time we cannot directly interfere
to prevent him from recovering that authority which he considers his birthright.
41. Although 1 apprehend much danger to the peace of the Gulf from the effects of
Sultan's ambition, yet if his power were firmly established, I don't think it would be a matter
of regret to us; since if he were well disposed, he would prevent the rest from molesting us,
and if not, it were better to have one head to look to than a number of independent pirates to
contend with ; his supremacy would prevent hostilities amongst the dependent tribes, who wou.'d
otherwise be quarrelling and committing piracies amonir themselves ; and supposing the worst
possible case, that he employed the whole power of the coast in piracy, the evil would be still
not greater than the individual piracy of each Chief; and the remedy would be easier, siuce
this very power would make him more tangible, give him more to lose, and therefore more to
dread from our vengeance; whilst it would enable us more easily, by the punishment of the
head, to reduce the members to subjection. In the opposite case the advantages of his power
are magnified.
42. I do not think that the Sultan is worse than any of the rest of the Chiefs; as is at
all events not worse disposed to us; and I am not without hopes that he may yet by his future
conduct prove himself worthy of a better character than he has hitherto borne ; but 1 cannot
regard him without considerable anxiety when thinking of the effects which may result from
his abilities, his power and ambition.
48. I am at a loss what to suggest in respect to his request to be allowed to erect lines
towards the land; it would be certainly better than he should not, but at the same time the
reasons he pleads are specious and natural, and I am not certain that the work he proposes
would at all strengthen the place, or protect its shipping, against the attacks from the sea
which is the quarter from which operations ought to be carried on; a wall on the land side only,
open to the town, and so constructed as not to defend by its flanks the approach by the creek,
or a long shore, would be much less mischievous than the strong houses of the Sheikh.
44. Sultan bin Suggur possesses a great many fine vessels, probably at least thirty, capable
of containing from fifty to one hundred men. He is building a large bughla of about 120 tons,
for the purpose, it is said, of trading to India. The other Chiefs have very few boats, beyond
those employed for fishing, probably none of them has more than three or four. I shall how
ever reserve a more particular account of the naval strength of the Jawassimis, until I shall
have received the Registers from the senior officer of the Marine. I may however remark
that Sultan bin Suggur must, I think, have contrived to secrete almost all his boats at the
time of the last expedition, since it is scarcely possible that so many large vessels could have
been built by him in so short a time as three yearg.
46. The next in importance is the Chief of Abnthabi, Sheikh Tahnun. This person
y*,. - « appears to be the principal Chief of the Beniyas
Chef of Ahuthah,. tribe, and the Chief of Duby is subordinate to