"ملف 61/11 IX (D 159) مسائل متنوعة خاصة بالحجاز ونجد" [و‎‎٤‎٩] (٣٩١/١٠٨)

this document is the property of his britannic majesty's government
October 18, 1939.
S ection 2.
[E 7017/549/25] Copy No.l
Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 18.)
(No. 140.)
My Lord, Jedda, Seftemher 19, 1939.
I HAVE the honour to submit a brief report on the situation as seen at
Jedda.
2. The German attempt to represent the visit of Khalid-al-Gargani, the
envoy of Ibn Saud. to Berlin as having great political significance did them more
harm than good in the eyes of Ibn Saud, who has no wish to be tied to Hitler's
chariot and to fly from known to unknown evils. It was reasonable that he
should try to obtain from the Germans arms which we could not supply, especially
if they were willing to grant favourable credits. Ibn Saud communicated to
His Majesty's Government the correspondence in which his envoy related the
progress of the negotiations with the Germans, and requested their advice when
the Germans asked for a neutrality agreement in return for the facilities
promised. The advice being rather long in coming, he on his own initiative
sent a polite refusal to enter into a neutrality agreement. It is interesting to
learn that the Germans hastened to accept Ibn Sand's point of view. Unless the
correspondence communicated to us has been falsified (and there is no reason
to believe this), Ibn Saud told the Germans openly that his interests prevented
his taking any step which would involve him in difficulties with His Majesty's
Government. The outbreak of war brought the negotiations to an end, and on
the 13th September Ibn Saud sent Khalid a telegram instructing him to return
home. Khalid had not enough money for the return journey, and as Ibn Saud
considered it impossible to send money to Germany, he instructed Khalid to go to
some neutral country, preferably Switzerland, where he could receive money from
Saudi Arabia for the journey home. Khalid is said to be due here soon, but
I have no official information on that point.
3. As Mr. Trott reported to you at the time, towards the end Khalid gained
the impression that the Germans were not anxious to supply the arms in any case.
If the Germans expected hostilities to break out soon, that might well be the case :
they would need all the arms they could get; Ibn Saud could not be relied upon
not to be sympathetic towards their enemy. Great Britain; and the foreign
exchange to be paid for the arms in instalments would probably never reach them.
Later, however, they seem to have been keen to supply the arms, and the agreement
was signed. Ibn Saud, however, seems to have taken it for granted that the
outbreak of war destroyed all hope of his getting the arms. I have received your
telegram No. 126, dated the 13th September, in which it is stated that if the
Germans are still willing to supply the arms without unacceptable conditions,
His Majesty's Government see no reason why Ibn Saud should not take advantage
of the offer, though as to the method of payment, about which His Majesty's
Government could make suggestions, they would deprecate the transfer of gold
to Germany. The agreement, a copy of which was transmitted in Mr. Trott's
secret letter of the 6th September to Mr. Baxter, provides for the sale of 10,000
Mauser rifles complete and 10 million cartridges for the sum of £119,962 3^.,
c.i.f. Jedda, payment to be made in seven equal instalments at dates from four
to seventy-six months after delivery of the goods.
4. It was to be expected that when the German Minister was handed his
passports by the Iraq Government he would try to make for Saudi Arabia, where
from the shelter of his other legation he might be a thorn in the side of the Allies,
and, in fact, he applied to Ibn Saud for permission to travel to Saudi Arabia
by land from Najaf, with several cars. Ibn Saud did not want to have Dr. Grobba
[730 s—2]
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