"ملف 61/11 IX (D 159) مسائل متنوعة خاصة بالحجاز ونجد" [ظ‎‎٤‎٩] (٣٩١/١٠٩)

in his country at all. He. could not refuse to receive him altogether, since
Dr. Grobba is accredited to him, but he found a good excuse for refusing to allow
him to come by land : he alleged that the tribes on the route, excited by the talk
of hostilities, and particularly by the news that Iraq had entered the war, migiit
make some regrettable mistake. It was expected here that after reaching Syria,
Dr. Grobba would make an attempt to reach Jedda by sea, but I have no news
of his movements or intentions.
5. The situation in Jedda is much more tranquil at present than I had reason
to expect a year ago. It seemed almost certain that Italy would be against us
if we went to war with Germany, and this would have turned Jedda into a
centre of propaganda and brought the war much nearer to Ibn Saud. Moreover,
at that time it was not foreseen that a conference would result in the adoption by
His Majesty's Government of a Palestine policy which not even the Arab
extremists could deny to be an improvement from their point of view, and which
would enable the Arab States to side with us whole-heartedly in case of a
European war. The Italian wireless broadcasts are carefully neutral and the
Italian Legation are not distributing any objectionable propaganda. Among
certain sections of the populace the violent German broadcasts, professing love
for the Arabs and disinterested wishes for their independence and their liberation
from the Jews, are not without effect, but on the other hand, it is the pilgrimage
that matters to Jedda and, indeed, to Saudi Arabia as a whole, and for that
the country is largely dependent on Great Britain and not at all on Germany.
Moreover, public opinion here has little or no effect upon Ibn Saud. who steers
his own course.
6. Ibn Saud defined his attitude in a message, which was reported in the
last paragraph of Jedda telegram No. 119, dated the 3rd September. In this
message Ibn Saud assures His Majesty's Government that he would never give
any undertaking or take any secret or open action with any Moslem or (other)
foreign Government which might damage British interests or affect his relations
with His Majesty's Government. This assurance is of a piece with Ibn Sand's
policy for many years past. He does not claim that he has any greater affection
for us than any other non-Moslem foreigners, but only that his interests are in
essence identical with ours.
7. It is early to say what course the war will take. The attitude of Italy
and Turkey must naturally be of great concern to Ibn Saud, and what policy
they will eventually adopt is at present unknown. All that can be said is that
for the moment the task of His Majesty's Legation in Jedda is easier than I
expected it would be. Ibn Saud is impatient to see me to discuss matters of
common interest, and in my telegram No. 123, dated the 13th September, I
suggested that, in the first place, I should pay him a visit at Riyadh; as an
alternative, he seems much to prefer to a suggestion that Captain de Gaury should
visit him. It was I who originally proposed that if war broke out it might
serve the interests of His Majesty's Government well if Ibn Saud would allow
us to have a representative at Riyadh, and suggested Captain de Gaury as the
ideal officer for this purpose, but from the comments of Ibn Saud, some received
before and some after the despatch of my telegram No. 123, it is evident that if
this project is still desirable, and is ever to be realised, it requires preparation
by a visit from the Minister at Jedda, which, as Ibn Saud says, would be generallv
considered natural and not, like a visit from Captain de Gaury, a highly abnormal
event. I am expecting to receive at any moment your instructions whether I am
to go to Riyadh.
8. The Foreign Office were aware, before I left England, that Ibn Saud
had decided to establish a legation in Paris and that Fuad Hamza had been
selected for this post. My French colleague, M. Ballereau, who is as active as
his predecessor was supine, claims that this step has been taken as a result
of his insistence. He declares that the Quai d'Orsay do not understand the
Arab point of view, and that he urged upon the Saudi Government their
responsibility to enlighten the French Government on this subject. It is more
than probable that Ibn Saud s main object is to urge the claims of his family
to the ! hrone of Syria and to counteract the influence of the Shereefian family,
but M. Ballereau. whether conscious of that fact or not, did not allude to it.
But whatevei is behind the appointment, it can hardly fail to be advantageous