"ملف 10/1 الامتياز النفطي بالبحرين" [و‎‎٨‎٢] (٤٧٦/١٧٨)

■ 5.
wondered whether there was any further action which might
be taken in the interests of the British Company which was
endeavouring to secure the Kuwait concession. Colonel fowls
thought that it was not desirable to do anything further at
the moment. He had seen the Sheikh fairly recently.
Lieutenant Colonel Fowle also said that the lull was
partly due to the uncertainty in the Sheikh's mind as to the
neutral zone. It is not yet known whether the Hasa
concession recently granted to the Standard Oil Company,
includes the neutral zone. It is not unlikely that Ibn Sand
added the neutral zone on the understanding that the Sheikh's
consent would be obtained, and that the King has already
approached the Sheikh on the subject. The probability is that
things will work out as they did in 1924, i.e. that Ibn Saud
will submit proposals regarding the neutral zone to the
SSieikh and that the latter will refer the matter to His
Majesty 1 s Government who will be left with the odium of anv
reiusal. There is a possibility that Ibn Saud might, by means
of one neutral zone, try to influence the Sheikh's decision
in regard to tne Kuwait concession, Mr. Rendel expressed
the view that if Ibn Saud tried to bring political pressure
bo bear on the Sheikh of Koweit in order to force him to
agree to the grant of a concession in the neutral zone to
Ibn bauo. s nominees, there would be good ground for strong
representations at Jedda.
It was suggested that the value of the Kuwait
concession depended on the value of the neutral zone, and Mr.
Starling undertook to ascertain from the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company whether they regarded a concession in the neutral
I zone as an essential adjunct to the Kuwait concession.
Mr .Rendel suggested that it might be possible to make a
distinction between the neutral zone and Kuwait proper.