"ابن سعود. ملاحظات للعقيد هاملتون، الوكيل السياسي في الكويت، تستند إلى محادثات في الرياض جرت في نوفمبر ١٩١٧" [ظ‎‎٧‎٣] (٦/٤)

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. . , n T was told that a party of nine 'Fnrkish and
and whik mnrctiiiig nwig i ■ ^ ^ ine ne;u , sha h going iu
German officers Imil just j ^rdK tltink likely; in fact, it is very improbable,
the opposite dmction. ■ ^ ^..^Turk or at any rate in favour of a
is not an
there are
the case
Of llni Sand andtbe^harif we ba^befriended toth, though naturally doing most for
ot Ion , , 1 t op r vices to the cause. Jbn Sa ud, however,
'I 1 ? ? h tth e^uaUv His mind harps on the question of the
thinks "e shorn le. ■ii,... ili'slrossfnllv between the disadvantages that will
Ulhunconditions l^uU in the victory of the Allies or the
reiitnl Powers. 00 ^Ve have sometimes thought that his possession ol llasa, which is
of such "Teat importance to his Emirate, from which he expelled the i nils a short
Ume before th,. war, would be an overwhelming argument .n our favour : that he
could only hope to keep it by holding on to our sk.rts. But such, I am reliably
kforined is n't reallv the case. Whichever side should win, he does not believe be
will be allowed to hold on to llasa for long, in view of the well-known cupidity am
acouisitiveness of great Powers. What is certain is that, should the A lies win and
the Turks be driven out of Arabia, he will have the mortihcation ol limling Ins nva
the Sharif firmly established as an influential and powerful monarch able to count on
the support of Great liritain and the Mahommedan world, while be Jim hand)
remains a mere Beduin chieftain—as he was before the war—but with the Sbnmmar
and Northern 'Anizah irretrievablv lost and the Sharif claiming overlor(lslii|) over the
border tribes. If, on the other hand, the Central Powers conquer as be thinks they
'will he will have the satisfaction of seeing King Husain go down, while as regards
his own position he relies on his political acumen to drive some sort of bargain with
the Turks. m , . t rn i i •
This rioes not mean that Ibn Sa'ud is pro-lurk. Ue hates the lurk as his
ancestors did and he likes and admires ihe British, infidels though they are. Hut it
is a matter of policy, and when policy is concerned he must regard the matter
entirely from the point of view of self-interest, i.e., the interests ol his dynasty and
the Wahabi faith, lie will not be induced to take any action unless the object is
justified primarily in these interests; in other words he has got it into his head that
he is not going to pull the chestnuts out of the tire lor us or for anyone. I his is
perhaps the reason that Ibn Sa'ud has not attempted seriously to take I lail or performed
any noteworthy feat during the war. lie hopes that, when our subsidies cease, the
tribes now supporting the Sharif will return to their former allegiance, lie says that
the Sharif is already on bad terms with some of the llarb and told me one day with
manifest elation that the Uaqhah section of the 'Ataibahhad been converted in a body
to the "Ikhwan," a religious brotherhocd which Ibn Sa'ud is fostering to the utmost
of his ability.
If the view of Ibn Sa'ud's policy which 1 have endeavoured to set down is correct,
it can be seen how foolish it would be to expect any thorough going co-operation from
him even if more liberally Subsidised. Indeed it is quite probable that any additional
subsidies we may give him would be used to buy back llarb and Ataibali Chiefs who
are now with the Sharif. The only means 1 can think of that would induce him to
suuutt as a i rmct; vis-u-vis tue j\iiig ol me mjaz ; aner win
money and arms, would have to be given with a liberal hand. What could ^
give as his part of the bargain? From my observation of the esteem in which
'Abdul Aziz is held in Central and South Central Arabia, 1 believe that I k 4 could, i
he chose to put his heart into it, raise the whole country.
V.
Ibn Sa'ud's Desiderata.
The following conditions would completely satisfy Ibn Sa'ud :—
(I.) That we should observe towards him the sam^policy of trust and coniidence
as we pursue in the case of the Sharif.
(2.) treating him on an equality with the Sharif, we should acknowledge his
hegemony in Najd, Central Arabia and its dependencies and, as we have conceded the
f