"أوراق تتعلق بتجارة الرقيق على الساحل الشرقي لأفريقيا والنظام المتبع لكبحها" [ظ‎‎٥‎٥] (٧٢/٥٠)

to his Excellency in Council that his Grace is under some misapprehension as to what has
lately occurred at Muscat. His Excellency in Council thinks that he is premature in
considering that Seyd Azan bin Ghes can be considered as the successor of Seyd Salim,
although for the present he appears to have partially established himself at Muscat; and,
at any rate, the revolution which has taken place cannot be considered as a conquest of
Muscat by the Wahabee Arab of the interior. Although holding some religious tenets in
common with them, he is, on the contrary, hostile to the Wahabee power, and it is
probable that, if the deposed Sultan regains power, it will be owing to Wahabee aid.
8. Without, therefore, going so far as to say that it is impossible that any such
changes or revolutions should occur in the ruling power of Muscat as to render the
decision of Lord Canning inapplicable, his Excellency in Council is clearly of opinion that,
under the circumstances which now exist, the subsidy has not ceased to be legally payable
according to the terms of the arbitration.
9. The question how far the faith of the British Government in India is pledged to
enforce payment of the subsidy by the Sultan of Zanzibar, as stated in paragraph 6 of the
Secretary of State's despatch, does not present itself to his Excellency in Council exactly
in the form suggested in paragraph 7. The Secretary of State intimates that the question
will arise as to whether the Government would be justified in refusing to allow the Sultan
of Zanzibar to get rid of his liability to pay the subsidy by war. It is probable, however,
that, if British compulsion were removed, the Sultan of Zanzibar would simply cease
paying the subsidy, and the question which the Government would have to decide would
be, whether they would be justified in refusing to the Sultan of Muscat the opportunity of
enforcing his rights by war. His Excellency in Council is of opinion that in such a
refusal the Government would not be justified. In connection with this subject, I am
directed to draw attention to a letter of 20th November last, from the Acting Political
Agent at Muscat, herewith inclosed.
10. As regards the second of the two questions stated by the Secretary of State in
his 6th paragraph, namely, how far we have any political interest in desiring that the
subsidy should continue to be paid, it appears to his Excellency in Council that the same
reasons which existed when the arrangement was made exist now, and therefore, as a
matter of policy, the payment of the subsidy to Muscat ought to be continued.
11. The question then arises whether we ought to take this payment on ourselves.
In his paragraph 9 the Secretary of State suggests that by doing so we might secure
adequate advantage on the side both of Zanzibar and Muscat to compensate us for the
sacrifice. He adds that the payment, if assumed by us, would be a charge on the Indian
revenues.
12. The advantage to be gained as regards Zanzibar is certain concessions in respect
to the Slave Trade to which Her Majesty's Government attach a high value. But it
appears to his Excellency in Council that this is so clearly an object of Imperial interest,
that the revenues of India could not be justly charged with any payment in order to secure
it; and his Excellency in Council would add that he believes this is the first time that a
proposition has been made to burden the Indian revenues for such an object.
13. On the side of Muscat, the Secretary of State intimates that we might obtain
important conditions as regards the peace and security of the Persian Gulf, which would
amount to an equivalent of the money expended. His Excellency in Council would,
however, observe that we obtain these conditions already by Treaty, and he does not see
what further concessions could be obtained from Muscat in this direction which we do
not possess already. If it is argued that, beyond the conditions referred to, the payment
of the subsidy to Muscat would be advantageous to India by preventing serious complica
tions in the Persian Gulf, his Excellency in Council believes that the same amount might
be expended much more advantageously by placing at the disposal of the Government a
force sufficient to insure that the existing Treaty should be observed, and to prevent any
complications arising that may disturb the peace in the Persian Gulf.
14. Reviewing the whole circumstances, his Excellency in Council does not hesitate
to express the opinion that it is undesirable that the existing relations between Zanzibar
and Muscat should be disturbed.