"D 93 نفط الكويت أ.ب.و.ك والنقابة الشرقية العامة المحدودة" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٦] (٥٢٦/٢٧٦)

+ ou 1 ld , set Bln Saua to agree to glverf
him the Neutral Zone, then the Shaikh of Kuwaits
consent would, follow as a matter of course, for
on } y t0 a:£ Press the wish to Shaikh
theTlatter wou^^affSi®!^. 1118 aPPrOVa1 ' alld
(3) Should (l) and (2) above happen, then Bin
S^d would certainly follow up matters by urging
the Shaikh of Kuwait to give the Kuwait oil con!
to S A PO £ th « E ff ,tern ^ General Syndicate and not
n f as it would be impossible to have one
*™i-h 0 W^ ny ^ in the Kuwait Neutral Zone and
another next door in Kuwait territory. Obviously
both must go together. 7
(4) The Shaikh of Kuwaits journey into the Southern
desert on 30 th Februaiy and 25th February accom-
pann-ed by Major Holmes confidential Secretary was
for the purpose of meeting the King or his son
buad, the intention being to prepare the ground for
the submission, by Holmes, of a draft proposal for
a concession for the Neutral Zone. (See this Office
Confidential Report No.44,dated b.3.3S.)to Bushire)
I tlli ® visi1: Holmes received a telegram
(18th March), from Bin Saud inviting him to Jeddah.
(6) The Shaikh of Kuwait, who clearly at heart
was anxious to give the concession both for Kuwait
and the Neutral Zone to Holmes, himself originated
the plan and suggested to Holmes that he should so
for the Neutral Zone first, get Bin Saud on his
side and then get the latter to press him (the
^ a -f' C> rxT : ^ W8 " i ?' t 9^S rant . tlle Kuwait concession to
himself (Holmes) • The Shaikh believed that with
Bin baud supporting him, he need not fear His Majes1y , s
Government's subsequent annoyance, if he agreed to
this form of pressure.
(7) Only fear of His Majesty's Goremment, or
moral suasion from Bin Saud would ever make the
Shaikh grant the Kuwait Oil Concession to the a .P # 0.C #
This being so H»M»S»Grovemment must either bring
quick pressure to bear on the Shaikh to grant the
concession the way they wanted it to go, or the
A.P»0»C f must forestall Major Holmes in the Neutral
Zone, get the concession for that piece or territory
from Bin Saud and get the latter to bring pressure
to bear on the Shaikh, where Kuwait was concerned#
i' :
i *
■
As the first proposal could probably be ruled
out it was absolutely vital to the A.P.O.C. that they
should, througji Longrigg in Jedda or other special
representative (the latter for preference) go w all out n
for a concession in the Neutral Zone without delay.
(8) Lastly Bin Saud intended giving no answer at
all to aity of the Jedda concession hunters till the
end of May or early in June
COMMENTS.
In my opinion the above statements are worthy of
Arab
careful thought. They were put in typically/roundabout fashion