"دراسة استراتيجية عن بلاد فارس والخليج العربي" [‎٤‎٩] (١٥٠/٥٧)

49
to arms of precision in possession of these frontier tribes attracted
the attention of the Government of India, and in 1907-08-09
attempts were made by the naval authorities to stop the traffic
along the Makran coast, but with little success. In 1910 more
stringent measures were adopted and a small military force em
barked on a R. I. M. vessel and raided arms depots on the Makran
andBiaban coasts. The telegraph station guards were also in
creased and systematic measures undertaken to prevent the trade.
Similar measures on a somewhat larger scale were carried out
in the spring of 1911 and since that date the naval blockade of the
Gulf has not been relaxed. The result has been to cause consider
able loss to the arms traders, but though the traffic to the Balu
chistan and MV.kran coasts has been to a great extent stopped, small
consignments are still run, the owners jettisoning arms on sight of
a man-of-war or armed launch. The trade has been also diverted
further up the Gulf, arms and ammunition being carried overland
to points on the Arabian Coast west of the'Oman peninsula, and
thence shipped to the Persian Coast. This, owing to the greater
length of coast to be watched, considerably increases the difficulty
of effective blockade.
83. While the blockade is still enforced, we have lately made an
attempt to check the traffic at its source at the distributing centre
i.e., Masqat. Under arrangements entered into with the Sultan, all
arms imported into his dominions are to be stored in a bonded ware
house and only issued to approved purchasers. It is hoped that these
measures will stop the illicit traffic, as there is no other free port
in the Gulf at which European traders can land their arms. Some
difficulty is, however, being experienced owing to French treaty
rights in Masqat and the question of the validity of the Sultan's
action is now the subject of negociations between London and Paris.
84. To show the extent of the traffic, it is estimated that the
number of arms imported into Afghanistan via Southern Persia rose
from 200 in 1900 to 40,000 in 1908 and fell to 27,000 in 1911, as
a result of the blockade ; the total number from 1900 to 1912 run
ning to nearly 200,000, of which probably one-third have reached
thelxands of the frontier Pathans. In addition, the Afghan tribes
have been also largely supplied with arms from the same source,
a fact which militates against the power of the central Government
to keep order and is consequently inimical to our interests. The
general arming of the tribes in South Persia is also one of the
chief causes of the present state of lawlessness in that country;
the power, not only of the tribes, but also of the individual
248GSB