"ملف 61/14 VIII (D 55) العلاقات بين نجد والعراق" [و‎‎٧‎٤] (٧٨٢/١٥٣)

[Thii Document is the Property oi His Britannic Majesty 's Government.]
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EASTERN (A rabia ). February 26, 1929.
CONFIDENTIAL. S ection 1.
[E 1034/3/91] No. 1.
Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—{Received February 26.)
(No. 44.)
Sir, Jeddah, February 6, 1929.
WITH reference to my telegram No. 17 of to-day's date, 1 have the honour to
transmit herewith a translation of a letter received from King Ibn ^aud in answer
to Mr. Jakins's communication of the 29th December (Jeddah despatch No. 230), and
a copy of the reply I have addressed to His Majesty.
2. On the receipt of this letter I immediately telephoned to the Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs asking him whether, as the result of this communication,
he now understood the King s proposals for the appointment of arbitrators. Fuad
Hamza admitted that the position had not been made an^ clearer. I therefore
informed Fuad that I was addressing a further communication to the King on the
lines of my recent conversation with him (as reported in my despatch No. 39 ol the
2nd instant), and would be grateful if he would himself, when forwarding this letter,
explain clearly the various points and impress their importance on His Majesty.
This Fuad promised to do.
3. In his communication under reference Ibn Sand explains his conditions 1
and 2 to mean that if Iraq is to appoint one arbitrator His Majesty's Government
should not also appoint one, as the Nejd nominee would then be faced with both an
Iraqi and a British nominee. It appears from this explanation that Ibn Saud has
not yet fully grasped the meaning of the arbitration proposal.
4. The King makes no mention in his letter of condition 6, of which Mr. Jakins
also requested an explanation, and I have therefore again approached him on this
point. Fuad Hamza, speaking unofficially, takes the King's meaning to be that if
a decision is given in favour of Nejd, Iraq's feelings should as far as possible be
spared, e.g., an immediate demolition of the offending posts should not be demanded,
but they should be vacated and allowed to disintegrate by natural processes.
Similarly, if a decision is given in favour of Iraq, Iraq shall not immediately proceed
to build more posts, nor shall Ibn Saud reply by building a chain of posts on his
side of the frontier. The underlying feeling in Ibn Saud's mind is, Fuad thinks,
that every effort should be made in giving effect to the decision of the arbitrators
not to aggravate ill-feeling between the two countries, but as far as possible to soften
the blow to the party against whom the decision is given.
5. The King explains the intention of his condition 4 at some length. He states
that the object of the arbitration is to arrive at a decision on the points of
disagreement which have arisen between the two parties. He maintains that he only
consented at Uquair to cede to Iraq territories claimed by Nejd on the express under
standing (article 3) that no buildings should be erected on these territories. His
Majesty's Government have refused to accept this interpretation of the article; thus,
as his acceptance of article 1 was conditional on the acceptance of article 3 as
interpreted by him, his cession of the territories to Iraq becomes ineffective—thus
the dispute between Iraq and Nejd centres not on article 3 alone, but on articles 1
and 3.
6. Ibn Saud therefore requests that the arbitrators should be approached by
both parties with a view to their considering the question of the frontiers in
addition to the question of article 3, which, as it arose out of article 1, cannot be
considered alone.
7. I have addressed a copy of this despatch, with its enclosures, to His
Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.
I have, &c.
F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.