"الملف 45/23 I (D 140) الإصلاحات في الكويت" [و‎‎١‎١‎٢] (٤٥٥/٢٤١)

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from the new Law. Article 3 which concerns Treaties,
monopolies a ,nd agreements is of special interest to us.
Bven here, howerer, the Council leave the signature of
such documents to the Shaikh. The stipulation tnat any
acts of the Shaikh need the Council's consent, whether
under this article or any other, is not so revolutionary
as might appear. All the other Rulers on the Arab side
of the Gulf, in Bahrain, the Trucial Coast, and Muscat,
invariably consult their family and notables before
taking any step of importance, whether this is with re
gard to an agreement with His Majesty's Government, a
concession to an Oil Company, or a Blatter of internal
administration. The difference that in Kuwait the powers
of the Council have been made so extensive, and reduced to
writing, is entirely due to the crass stupidity - I can
use no milder term - of the shaikh (see paragraph 2 of
my telegram quoted above). Bven after he had agreed to
the Council as elected, the shaikh perservered in futile
intrigues to undermine the Council, which merely served
to exacerbate both them, and public opinion generally#
9. Reference the leakage of iqy letter to the
Shaikh, referred to in paragraph 21 above. de Gaury is
of the opinion, and I agree with him, that the arrival
of this letter and its fortuitous leakage, came at the
pysohological moment. The movement against the Shaikh
was, as has been seen, overpowering, and a trial of strength
between the popular party and the Ruler, in which the
former were certain to have won, was bound to have occurred,
either now or in the immediate future. My advice to the
Shaikh to form a Council naturally fitted in with the plans
of the popular party, and is indeed one of the main reasons
that for the moment at all events they are extuemely friendly
t owe rds us. Had the movement, however, come to a head
\ without/