"F 83 ملف 82/27-II نفط قطر" [ظ‎‎٢‎٤‎٦] (٦٣٠/٥٠٨)

r
Position of Area lying between Base of Qatar Peninsula and Blue Line of
Anglo-Tukkish Convention of 1913. i ^
10. If, in these circumstances, it is accepted that the southern boundary of Qal'^Ibt'
should be a line running via or to the north of Sakak more or less south-east fri^rfnrtl
Bohat-as-Salwa or a point slightly to the north of Dohat-as-Salwa to a point to r sit
north of the Khor-al-Odeid, the difficult question arises of the position of the count' v
lying between such a line and the blue line of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 191 . •
.Up
Importance of ^Maintaining the Blue Line. bj#
11. On the one hand, it appears definitely important if possible to maintain
blue line laid down in the unratified Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913 as agaip^ 1
Ibn Saud or any other future ruler of this part of Arabia. While the 1913 Conventi
was never ratified, the blue line at any rate represents the agreement reached at t
time between Turkey and His Majesty's Government as to the limits of Tnrki ^
authority in northern Arabia and on the Persian Gulf, and in dealing with Ibn Sai|foiereai
as the successor in title to the Turks we can, it would seem, not unreasonably ti as is
our stand on it. The difficulties of finding any satisfactory substitute are palLtea^
The undesirability of giving Ibn Saud, in the absence of any definite eastern bounda '^kr
to his territories, an excuse for territorial expansion (as distinct from the exercise, ggt (lei
at present, of an informal influence and the receipt from our Arab clients of paymeii
which we do not recognise and the existence of which we ignore) in the hinterland^ l
the Trucial Coast and of Muscat is equally clear. Such expansion would clea], coN( y
involve a risk either of his coming into conflict with the local rulers, whose tre^isi
relations with His Majesty's Government he has formally lecognised, or of -1' w
establishing an influence in the Sheikhdoms in question so powerful as to ; l
embarrassing from our point of view. fris-^eWant,-finally, that confidential
! ■ mation suggests that ibn Saud does nothimself at the moment seriously question
blue line.
ij if O *j 161 "Vj i if . .
Disadvantages of Maintenance of the Blue Line while fixing Southern Boundari 1 5
? n m of Qatar at the Base of the Qatar Peninsula. • psoieijoj
■Uiptl
12. At the same time, important on general grounds, for the reasons given,j| ra j| 01
the maintenance of the blue line appears to be, the fact must be faced that in jijonp
present case, if we continue to regard it as the eastern boundary of Ibn Saud's territo;., j|y
and if, as suggested, we accept a southern boundary lor Qatar running roughly acra'y^
the base of the Qatar Peninsula, a not inconsiderable area lying between the
States, and peopled by migratory Bedouin tribes, will be left in an indetermin^,^^
political position. There is a possibility that the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, who has
the past exercised a wide influence, and made tribal alliances of his own, in |litlie(|ii(
trucial hinterland—c/. Sir P. Cox's letter No. 176 of 28th June 1904—might prpsohhi
some claim to such an area. But, though on this point further information will |ti){ [()D1
sought from the Resident, there seems little evidence of any active interest on iiflie jsta
part of Aha Dhahi in any area to the west of Aqal. Assuming that no such clfs: "To -iaj
exists, or could be substantiated, the alternatives are to recognise the area ^ 0 f
belonging to Ibn Saud; to recognise it as belonging to the Sheikh of Qatar; or
regard it as a political no-man's land. ifefe 'i
13. If we recognised it as belonging to Ihn Saud we could, if necessary, call
him to;keep Bedouin raids into Qatar from it under control. But such recogniti-::;^
would not merely be inconsistent with the maintenance of the blue line of the l ( J%p r0 p e]
Convention, to the abandonment of which, as stated above, the objections appear tolt^y
Strong, but would represent a formal acceptance of Saudi sovereignty to the bordpl^
or Qatar and Abu Dhabi which might well prove embarrassing. Wbq j
14. If, on the other hand, it is attributed to the Sheikh of Qatar, we should % 8S
justified in expecting the full co-operation of the Sheikh in dealing with Bedo^toienof
activities within its limits. But such an attribution would not merely to give to Qat^tHt^
a eubstantial area which she does not in the past appear to have claimed, but wo#^
extend the limits of any liability for protection which we may undertake in connecti^tli eex j s
with the grant of an oil concession. It might be necessary to claim the area (or :; ':orH 0 |
any rate its coastal strip) for Qatar if there were serious signs of foreign inten* ^
in it or of an intention on the part of Ibn Saud to occupy it. But pending su ^j^^
developments it seems wiser to limit our commitments and to avoid any extension 4 ^
the area recognised by us as Qatar.