سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان [ظ‎‎٤‎٥] (٣١٢/٩٢)

The Liberia believes that there is little hope of |
averting a breach between Russia and England.
The Eiforma writes in the same-sense, adding ;
that the Anglo-Russian question in India is des
tined to assume enormous proportions, and that
only one thing may be prophesied with certainty, !
namely, that the Ameer of Cabul will be crushed
between the two Powers.
(By Submarine Telegraph.)
(FROM OUR OWN CORRKSPOKDKITT.)
VIENNA, Friday.
The Free Press, writing again on the difficulty
between England and Afghanistan, says that even 1
as a conqueror England promotes liberty, whilst
Russia only seeks for more power in order to
increase the millions of unhappy beings whom a
merciless discipline drills in the notion that the
highest aim of existence consists in reaping the
, honour of saying 11 Ave Ccesar, raorituri te salutant."
(Eedter's Telegrams.)
SIMLA, Sept. 27.
Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, the Special
Envoy sent by the Viceroy to Cabul, has returned
to Peshawur.
BOMBAY, Sept. 27.
Several papers designate Lieut. General Crawford
Chamberlain as the Commander in Chief of the
Army for Afghanistan.
BERLIN, Sept. 27.
Lord Augustus Loftus, the British Ambassador
at St. Petersburg, in passing through Germany on
his return to the Russian capital, had an interview
with Prince Gortschakoff.
It is believed that the Afghanistan question will
not lead to any explanations between England and i
| Russia. i
i The military preparations which have been
promptly undertaken by the Indian Government
for the exaction of due reparation from Shere Ali
for the insult offered to this country by his abrupt
refusal to receive the Chamberlain Mission are
becoming daily more developed, as our telegrams
from India published this morning inform us. The
! country will perceive in these vigorous measures not
only a determination on the part of the Indian
Government to cope at once with the danger that
arises from the declared indifference, or rather
hostility, of the Afghan ruler towards us and India ;
but also a proof that the long-pending difficulties
with his State, which may be said to have gone on
i aceutn ulating during thefifteen yearsthat.have elapsed ;
! sinfte the death of Dost Mahomed , had compelled 1
the Indian Council to arrive at the conclusion that |
to bring Shere Ali to a just appreciation of his i
position and his relations towards ourselves was a.l
task that could not be achieved by diplomatic |
means alone. In estimating the present state of 1
affairs full prominence should be given to the fact '
that Shere Ali's ill-will to this country has not
sprung into existence in a day. Long before the
Umbala Durbar he showed his true mind towards
us by acts of equivocation in his dealings with
Persia, and even with Russia, if half was true that
was said of his doings at Herat when expelled from
Candahar in 18G7. And even that Durbar did not
allay the restless promptings of his • mind. He
accepted his subsidy, and he treasured up
the presents in money and in arms that
were showered upon him; but his -friendly
sentiments towards us never impelled him
to relax the stringent check he maintained
on all intercourse between his country and
Hindostan. The Seistan frontier decision, by
■which Shere Ali obtained a considerable strip of
territory,'the refusal to permit the Forsyth Mission
to return from Kashgar through his dominions, his
■ intrigues with the mountain tribes and with the
late Akhond of Swat , and finally his reftentment
at our arrangements with Khelat, all mark stages
in the devious policy he has tor years pursued,
which have now culminated in the outrage
committed upon a British officer in the Khyber
Pass.
These facts were patent to all men, and the
Government, with special means at their disposal
for ascertaining the true significance of the conduct
of the ruler beyond their frontier, evidently
arrived at the conclusion that Shere Ali's attitude
was dictated by a persistent policy of hostility,
quite as much as by the more personal impulses
of vanity and ambition. The Indian Council,
knowing these things, sanctioned precautionary
steps being t^ken before the departure of the
English Envoy, and of the wisdom of those precau
tions there can now be little doubt. The Indiaia
Government could not have authorised these
measures unless it had realised the necessity for
them, and now that their foresight is confirmed by
| the action of Shere Ali it may be assumed that
the policy which was sketched when hopes were
still indulged in of an amicable arrangement of the
difficulty will not only be persisted in, but will be
worked out with firmness and resolution. The
military preparations which have been for many
weeks in progress could not have reached such an
advanced stage as they are happily at the present
moment if the possibility of such steps becoming neces-
I sary had not been recognised by our Indian states
men. The principal command of the expeditionary
force which is concentrating at Peshawur is placed
in the hands of Lieutenant General Crawford
Chamberlain , a brother of our intended Envoy.
This officer has had considerable experience in
Afghan warfare, and his reminiscences of our
previous occupation of the country will serve him*
in good stead. The column which he is about to
lead will probably number fifteen thousand men,
consisting, for the most part, of those troops which
were to have formed the camp of exercise at Hagsan
Abdal, and which are now awaiting at Rawul
Pindee the means of transport to begin their
advance. The object before this column is to con
centrate at Peshawur, and then to hold the mouth
of the Khyber in force. Its primary object will
be to effect an understanding with the Afreedees 1
and Momunds. The movements of this, the largest
of the three columns, will be deliberate, and we
shall not, in our firm resolve to exact prompt and
complete redress from Cabul, court a preliminary
repulse by a premature attack on the Khyber.
The second column, under the command of
General Roberts , lately commanding at Peshawur,
and the former Quartermaster General to the Army,
is concentrating at the position of Kohat before it
advances on the village of Thull. The garrison of
Kohat has been reinforced by six thousand men !
under General Roberts , who has brought those
troops from Peshawur through the Kohat Pass,
and among these it will be noticed that artillery
i occupy a prominent place. Three whole batteries
' of field artillery and Colonel Le Mesurier's
mountain battery have been directed on Kohat,
whence they will march on Thull, where four
thousand men have already arrived. This column
will at once proceed to occupy the Khurum
Valley, and thus secure a dominant position on the
very threshold of the Afghan State. The move
ments of fhis column are of the most immediate
interest, although it is generally understood that,
once the Khurum Valley has been occupied, our
forces will not, for the present at least, advance
farther from their base at Thull. The movements of
the third column are more speculative, but it is clear
from our/ telegrams that a large force is collecting
at Mooltan, under the command of General
Biddulph , and that a reserve is in course of forma
tion under General Stewart , Other troops appear
to have received instructions to combine with this
| force from Bombay and Madras, and it is even said
that from the former a siege train is also expected.
These will probably be sent by sea to Kurrachee,
thence toSukhur, where another detachment is being
collected. In the meanwhile the garrison at Quettah
has been strengthened by three thousand men, pro
bably drawn from the troops at Dadar and Jaco-
babad. That reinforcement will serve to make
Quettah impregnable even in the unlikely
contingency of the Afghans attempting to surprise
it; and when General Biddulph arrives with the
column at present at Mooltan he will find himself
with at least ten thousand men available for a forward
movement. So far as the preparations go, the details
of which have been so carefully worked oUt, there
can be nothing but complete satisfaction at them.
They represent the preliminary stages of a plan for
effectually coercing Shere Ali , and whatever sup
porters he may have, in which it is impossible to
discover a flaw. The whole defence of Cabul seems
likely to be paralysed before the triple demonstra
tion that is taking place upon its frontier. It is
not so satisfactory to perceive that there are
still advocates for half-measures, persons who have
sanctioned these advanced preparations, yet who
hesitate to carry them out to their only logical
conclusion. Having by our promptituu'a secured
the great advantages of menacing Cabul from three
points of vantage, are we, in the probable event of
Shere Ali persisting in his defiance, to remain