"ملف 8/15 سلسلة الجزيرة العربية - ١٩٣٣-١٩٣٩" [و‎‎١‎٦‎٤] (٤٣٤/٣٢٧)

the opportunity to see His Excellency Fuad Bey and to speak of the matter
again.
It is true that when one of Mr. Philby’s cars broke down the Aden autho
rities did not object to his going into the Hadhramaut to obtain spares, but
no such need drove Mr. Philby to visit Shabwa, which is incontestably
in the Aden Protectorate though not in the Hadhramaut and it was in parti
cular on the question of Shabwa that I based the earlier conversation which
I had with His Excellency Fuad Bey. No suspicion can attach to the Govern
ment of H. M. King Abdul Aziz in this matter in view of the assurances which
they have given, but Your Royal Highness will permit me to say that it is
for His Majesty’s Government to judge how the arrival of Mr. Philby with
an armed Saudi force (or escort) might be viewed by persons living in the Aden
Protectorate. But I do not wish to prolong this question any further, and
I conclude by stressing the comment which I made to His Excellency Fuad
Bey on December 26th as to the great impropriety committed by Mr. Philby
in procuring an armed force (or escort) from the Saudi Government for topo
graphical work in Najran and using it, without their knowledge, for a quite
different and an illegitimate purpose, viz., to enter the territory of the Aden
Protectorate,
(14)
{Received on 20th February 1937 with Political Secretary's letter No. 5, dated
iih February 1937.)
Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter, dated 27th January 1937.
Letter from Foreign Office, London, to Sir Miles Lampson, Cairo,
No. 81, dated 25th January 1937.
I have read with interest Your Excellency’s Secret despatch No. 1385
(820/4/36) of the 18th December [S. No. (11)], regarding the question of Italian
activities in the Yemen. I am fully alive to the most disquieting features
of the situation discussed in your despatch and the question of the policy
of His Majesty’s Government in this matter is forming the subject of consi
deration in the Middle East Official Sub-Committee of the Committee of Im
perial Defence.
2. In the meantime, while I do not wish to minimise the dangers of the
position, there are certain considerations which suggest that the Italian Gov
ernment may not be so firmly determined on a policy of intensive penetration
in the Yemen as has sometimes been suggested. I shall welcome an early
expression of your views on the following considerations.
3. In the first place, as you are aware, the Italian Government have vir
tually undertaken in the Rome understanding with His Majesty’s Govern
ment of 1927 not to establish themselves at any point on the Arabian coast
of the Red Sea. I realise that it would be unwise to place too much reliance
on such an undertaking on the part of the Italian Government but it should
be noted that it is accompanied by a corresponding virtual undertaking on
the part of His Majesty’s Government that they also will not establish them
selves on any point of the Arabian coast of the Red Sea; and that the Italian
Government have in the past shown that they attach great importance to this
undertaking to which they have frequently appealed. The view has more
than once been expressed that one of the many motives inspiring Italian
policy to-day is a fear that His Majesty’s Government may themselves be aim
ing at some extension of their territorial or political influence in Arabia.
Such a fear is unfounded, but to the Italian mind it may appear to possess
some reality, and it cannot, therefore, be entirely excluded in considering Ita
lian policy in this area. The Italians no doubt realise that if they were to
violate the Rome understanding of 1927 they would thereby free His Majesty’s
Government from any obligation under that understanding. They would thus
enable His Majesty’s Government to occupy any area they desired in the Yemen
bb(C) Ex Affairs Dept