"ملف 4/1 الموارد المالية للبحرين ٣" [و‎‎٨] (٥٦٨/٢٠)

avoid antagonising the Ruling Family on vhose goodvili our
position end policy (K vai Base, Air Route arrangements and so
on) is buii-t up.
5. I venture, moreover, to think that we should not iBL-ose
too rigidly upon Bahrain our own, very alien, ideas of (what
I may term) constitutional finance. It is but a few years since
the Shaikhs took all they could extract from people; today there
is a properly drawn up budget to vdiich the Banr&in 'uovernment
strictly adhere. His rxcealency Shaikh air Henu o bin * Isa
A1 Khalifah has accepted the principle (though it is by no
means firmly established as yet) of dividing the oil royalties
in a proportion of one-third to the Ruler and his Family and
two-thirds to the Bahrain Government, and if the Ruling Family
C£n point to a grievance over the reductions in their c ilOkicJices,
it vill make it harder to establish this principle. I do not
think that we should be well advised to press for further self-
denial by the Ruling Family. After all, ou£ interest in the
finances of the Bahrain Itate is confined (a) to not having to
iVy vt/vtO
come to its rescue with, (b) to seeing that enough Honey io
allocated to the Bahrain Government (as opposed to the Ruling
F - : mily) to ensure a reasonable standard of administration and
to build up a reserve for the future. These considerations
are being fulfilled (the reserve has, indeed, already been
restored and will be increased) and I, therefore, recommend
that, having safeguarded the needs of the administration in the
important mrtter of the division of royai-ties, we should avoid,
firstly, drawing upon ourselves the odium which mist inevitably
attach to preventing e restoration of the reductions mcac to
meet a past emergency and, secondly, providing our enemies with
/a perfect