"ملف 4/13‎ I الزبارة" [و‎‎١‎٥‎٩] (٦٦٠/٣٢٢)

-3-
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iiad actually receiYed a letter from him the previous
day. 1 informed the representatives that the Na ! im
had given an undertaking in the same terms as Shaikh
1 Abdullah bin Qassim and I saw no reason for presuming
that they were any more likely to break their word than
the Shaikh himself.
3. Tov/ards the end of the meeting I asked him if
they were keeping Shaikh »Abdullah bin Qassim informed
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that happened"
4. Shaikh Nasir then volunteered the information
that the Na f im were causing considerable worry as a
number of other people, Qatar subjects, were joining
the Na f im gathering and in reply to my remarks that
I could not believe that the loyal subjects of Qatar
were joining the Na y im, he stated that the subjeots of
Qatar were not all of them loyal and that this extra
gathering was causing concern to Shaikh 1 Abdullah bin
Qassim. I told him that I had that morning received
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a report to the effect that Shaikh 1 Abdullah bin
Qassim himself was preparing for eventualities should
the negotiations break down. Shaikh Nasir said that
he knew nothing of this.
5. From my conversation with the Adviser and from
this interview I have come to the conclusion that the
two representatives had not come to Bahrain with any
• “l
practical intentions of seeking a solution but that they
were sent because the Shaikh of Qatar desired to be able
to say that he had abided by the request of the Political
Resident/-