ملف رقم ١٥٠٨ لسنة ١٩٠٥، جزء ١ "البحرين: الوضع؛ الاضطرابات (١٩٠٤-١٩٠٥)؛ استسلام الشيخ علي؛ مسألة الإصلاحات الإدارية (الجمارك إلخ)" [و‎‎٢‎٢‎٥] (٥٣١/٤٥٥)

3
We then parted, I proceeding ashore to the British Agency at Manama
and the Sheikh to Muharrag to despatch a messenger after the absentees.
9. December 1st .—Sheikh Ali did not return. Sheikh Esa sent to inquire
whether he should call at the Agency. I replied that as Sheikh Ali had not
arrived I would not trouble him to-day, but reiterated the necessity of expe
diting his nephew’s return and begged that he would come over on the morrow
forenoon in any case, whether his nephew had returned or not.
10. December 2nd .—Sheikh Ali still absent. Sheikh Esa came over from
Muharrag about 10 a.m., and we had another lengthy interview at which
Captain Prideaux was present. I thought it was now time to speak to the
Chief plainly and to apprise him of my views, as time was slipping by. I told
him that I had in the first instance frankly accepted his assurance that his
nephew and followers were only out for a shooting excursion and that he could
get them back at once, but that this was the third day of my presence in
Bahrein and that he could hardly wonder if I began to suspect that their
absence was preconcerted.
I then went on to say that my view as to what measures it was incumbent
upon him to take in regard to the German case coincided with those of Mr.
Gaskin and Captain Prideaux, namely, that the ringleaders should be flogged;
Bs. 1,000 paid in compensation; and that Sheikh Ali be compelled to leave
Bahrein, subject to approval of Government. Sheikh Esa then entered into a
Ion? demur in which he took up the cudgels for Sheikh Ali and argued that he
had done nothing to deserve such punishment, as that involved by measures
suggested, to all of which he demurred. This brought the specific question of
Sheikh A IPs position in Bahrein into the discussion. I reminded Sheikh Esa
that I had been some five years in the Gulf and that from what Sheikh Ali had
himself told me at Maskat I had for long.been aware of his character and his
not unnaturally disaffected attitude. I reminded Sheikh Esa that only six
months ago he had, I thought, confided in Mr. Gaskin regarding his nephew’s
troublesome personality and had prompted our representative to address to me
a proposal * for the making of a public
pronouncement in Bahrein in such plain
terms that Sheikh Ali would accept it as
applying to his own case, without the
necessity of any specific mention of his name. I added that the idea had had
my cordial approval, and that it had only awaited the advent of a more senior
Political Officer at Bahrein before being taken into serious consideration.
I explained to him that his present surprising attitude in championing
Sheikh Ali could only convey the impression that so long as Sheikh All’s
doings affected his own convenience and peace of mind injuriously, nothing
was °bad enough for his nephew. He was said by his uncle to be disloyal,
turbulent and most felonious in his tendencies. On the other hand, now that
he was involved in an obvious offence against Europeans or others under the
protective purview of the British Agency, Sheikh Esa and his son and heir
were found to take his part and give him all possible support. How did he,
Sheikh Esa, think the Government of India would interpret such an attitude
on his part after all they had done for him ?
In reply the Chief admitted his previous inward misgivings regarding
Sheikh Ali, but explained that he did not fear his machinations or secret enmity
now in his own lifetime but rather later on after his demise.
He then repeated the arguments he had employed before in palliation of
what had passed, and urged that the whole incident or incidents would be
adequately met and Sheikh Ali effectively subdued by my giving him a severe
talking to in the presence of his uncle and Captain Prideaux.
I was unable to concur in this view, and after considerable reiteration and
further discussion the Sheikh finally agreed that as soon as Sheikh Ah
returned— , . , , i j j
( 1 ) The compensation money of Rs. 1,000 should be levied and lodged
at the Agency.
(2) The four or five ringleaders having been produced or identified
should be whipped and expelled from Manama.
* Firfe this office letter No. 136 of 19th May
1904 and Foreign Department No. 2067-E.A.,
dated 30th June 1904.