"السياسة المستقبلية بشأن الساحل المتصالح. مراسلات بين وزير الدولة لشؤون الهند، والحكومة في الهند، والمقيم السياسي في الخليج الفارسي (١٩٢٩)" [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٢] (١٠/٦)

During my last visit to Dubai I asked them to propound a scheme of control for
my consideration and to send it to Bushire. They promised to do so, but nothing
has materialised.
10. With i •egard to the question of the appointment of a British Political Agent
on the Trucial Coast, the position has not materially altered since Sir Percy Cox
discussed the question in his letter No. 284 of the 2otn January 1913 : —
“ We must expect the newly-elected Shaikh to continue like his predecessor
in the hands of a camorra of his ignorant and reactionary relatives, and with
the means at my disposal 1 see no likelihood of being able to effect any
change in their attitude, as long as present conditions of British representation
on the Coast are maintained, under which, though useful in other local ways,
the Arab Agent of the Residency wields no appreciably helpful influence where
the larger questions of British interests or policy are concerned.
i\i i;r
“ Our forbearance from proceeding forcibly with the inception of our mild
measures of progress has borne no fruit in the past two years ; on the contrary,
the Debai community has only become the more confirmed and confident in
its passive obstruction, through the Shaikh, to the least advance. In fact such
movement as there has been, has been retrograde, for whereas no definite
objection was ever evinced to the occasional sojourn of approved Europeans
for business purposes, the Shaikh has made the Hyacinth incident a pretext for
refusing admission to any European or quasi-European, even as agent for the
British India Steam Navigation Company’s steamers; and I am convinced that
until we do put our foot down to check this factious obstruction we shall
make no headway.”
The statements made by Sir Percy Cox are still true. The Residency Agent is of
the greatest assistance in most matters; but he is still unable to force through the
larger issues of British policy. On the other hand, our experience at Bahrain, where
the Government of India’s attempt to pursue a cautious policy failed, and finally an
ultimatum, backed by force, had to be issued, shows that even British officers find it
impossible sometimes to beat down the stubborn obstinacy of Arab Chiefs and their
“ camorra.”
11. I have consulted the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, who is in
immediate touch with the Trucial Chiefs. In the course of his reply to my enquiry,
he wrote:—
“. . . From many years of association with naval officers, both in days of
smiles and crimes, the Trucial Arabs have developed a sort of friendship
towards them, which they do not feel towards other Europeans ; but the Shaikh
of Dubai last year would not agree to naval officers landing to look around the
town unless accompanied by armed guards supplied by Isa or himself. The
Trucial Chiefs are definitely supicious of anything which to them appears as
the thin edge of the European wedge poking its nose into their territories, and
any innovation will certainly be resisted, though not by any means necessarily
at once or by open methods. They object to motor-cars and motor-boats,
though Isa, by patient persuasion, has prevailed upon them to allow him to
possess both. They object to such ideas as post offices and wireless, but when
the slow mail calls at Dubai she receives letters to carry and the wireless
operator receives bundles of messages to send. They frankly regard Bahrain
as a typical example of the grasping hand of Britain, which, being given an
inch, finally obtained possession of the whole place. Whether they are truly
independent or not, they have a sturdy spirit of independence as regards
determination to control their own affairs; and the first Shaikh who admits a
Political Agent to be quartered upon him will be regarded as having sold his
birthright. Many if not most of our steps in our progress towards developing
control of the coast have been made by way of punishment (e.g. permission for
Isa to fly the Jack at Shargah) and this is known to the Arabs ; in fact a
Shaikh can at times keep his people under control by reminding them that if
they do anything disliked by the Government the penalty will be some greater
measure of Government control. Consequently the appointment of a Political
Agent would be received as a serious punishment.”
I have made this long quotation from the Senior Naval Officer’s opinion for
comparison with Sir Percy Cox’s views of 1913 as, together, they form an admirable