"مذكرة للنقيب إيستويك" [ظ‎‎٢‎١] (١٠/٢)

and organize his troops fell to the ground. The
employment of British Officers in the Persian army
is a measure to he encouraged, as the local know
ledge and influence they acquire may prove of the
greatest advantage to their own Government under
certain contingencies, which may occur earlier than
expected.
8. In the same manner the knowledge of lan
guages, and of the people, and of localities, which
would probably be acquired by British Commanders
and officers of the Shah’s vessels in the Persian
Gulf (should the project ever be realized), would
be most useful to our own Government. Every
year we miss more and more the special qualifi
cations of the Officers of the Indian Navy, and if
any school for training up a similar class of men
could be found, it would be an advantage to the
public service.
9. I must confess, however, that I very much
doubt whether the Shah’s project of a steam navy
will ever be carried into effect, nor do I consider
that it is a result to he desired, or to be promoted
by us, except in so far as not seeming to thwart the
Shah’s wishes. The difficulties of providing the
funds appear to me almost insurmountable. Neither
the Shah nor his ministers have probably formed
any idea of the large sum required. The only
feasible arrangement would be that an assignment
should be made upon the customs of Bushire, and
upon the revenues of Shiraz, but to this it is not
likely that the Shah would be prevailed upon to
consent.
10. Should there really seem a prospect of the
establishment of a Persian war navy, it will be
requisite to make provision beforehand that it
should not be turned into a means of aggression
against Muscat, or against any of the maritime Arab
Chiefs with whom we have engagements, nor should
Persia be permitted to revive obsolete claims to
territory (to Bahrein, for instance), nor to interfere
in any way with the acknowledged supremacy of
the British Government in the Gulf, by w hich alone
the lawlessness of the maritime Arabs is restrained.
England and India are largely interested in the
safety of commerce in these waters. Trade with
India is increasing, and is likely to increase, if only
proper facilities be given, and if the security that
has of late existed be maintained. This security
depends entirely upon the repressive policy of the
British Government.
11. It must also be recollected that any dimi
nution of the prestige of British power in the Gulf
and in the neighbouring countries would probably
react more or less upon India, and be productive of
injurious effects, especially in certain provinces, such
as Sind, Hyderabad in the Deccan, and Kattywar,
and among those Native Princes and Chiefs who
employ Arab retainers and mercenaries, and into
whose territories there is a constant influx of immi
grants from the shores of Hadramant and Oman.