ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣ الجزء ٨ " الجزيرة العربية - السياسة تجاه ابن سعود" [ظ‎‎٣‎٢‎٠] (٦٠٢/٢٢٥)

“ On the other hand, the advantages seem to be considerable
«( a .) Complete control of the Arabian littoral of the Persian Gulf.
“ (b) Similar complete control of the arms trarhc. . n ,
<‘(c.) The practical exclusion of foreign Powers and influence in Cental
“ (d ) The^security induced by British suzerainty and ‘Bin Sand’s’ strong
( ’ control of the Bedouin tribes will give a great impetus to trade
through the Persian Gulf ports, probably diverting a share of what
“ (r ) ThTg^UnflurcfB^Saud has over'Mohammedan opinion in Arabia
an mfluence likely to increase as the Turkish Empire breaks up a d
the Khalifate of the Sultan is questioned, will be a British asset.
“(f) Bin Saud’s influence with all Arab tribes, and particularly with the
{f ' Northern Anazah, with whom our occupation of Lower Mesopotamia
will bring us m close contact.
Upon receipt of Captain Shakespear’s report. Sir R Cox
16th Tanuarv 1915 to the Government ol India (17000/ld85/15 . . ) y
if Bin Saul’s’ desiderata, and made the following further suggestions
“ Bin Sand should undertake :—
Fi rs t—To receive representative of British Government either at his
capital^ s^ea-portm- both, rf ( d t ® S ) lre e d xtra . territoriality for our non-Mohammedan
3Uh ^Thirdly.—yo abstain from waging war by sea without our consent, and to
co-operate for the suppression of piracy. _ . , . •,
“ Fourthly .—To protect pilgrim traffic passing through his territory.
^ To levy customs dues at rates which we consider reasonable,
having; regard to rate prevailing at Bahrein and Koweit. _
“Sixthly.—To allow British merchant vessels to visit his ports.
“ Seventhly —To agree to locate post office and possibly telegraph office at his
port when the time comes.”
“I do not include any item regarding slave trade, as that is not now a
serious difficulty, and has given us no trouble at Koweit.
“ Only point regarding which it seems necessary to offer comment here is the
question o'f protection against external aggression by land. When we ynyited
Bin Baud to move on Basrah, we undertook to protect him against reprisals by
Turks, so that, as far as latter are concerned, what Bin Baud now asks us to give
does not amount to much more. Apart from Turks, Central Arabia is practical y
inaccessible by land to any Power but ours, and I venture to think that we should
incur little risk by giving the desired undertaking, subject to (the) reservation
that aggression be unprovoked. . . f . .
“We have publicly declared that our object is to effect liberation of Arabs
from oppressive yoke (of) Turkey. In this case there is no question of annexation
of territory to which our allies could take exception, while Bin baud s weight m
scale would be no mean asset to joint cause of us all. Can I possibly be auth°f ls “
to draft a treaty on above lines for negotiation by Captain Shakespear . I sba
not now have the opportunity of meeting Bin Baud myself.
“ I am obliged to give Bin Baud some reply by his messenger, who has orders
to return at once. I am sending Captain Shakespear purport of above a dd ; tl0 “ a '
points and asking him to use his discretion m discussing them with Bin baud, io
Bin Baud I am replying that I hope that an instrument safeguarding his position
can be arrived at somewhat on lines indicated, and that I have telegraphed t
Government on subject, but that treaty must necessarily take a little time
draw up.”
«
On the 29th January, 1915, after further correspondence with Sir P. Cox
<21633/15, Nos. 3 and 8 ), the Viceroy telegraphed to the India Office as f
<11837/1385/15):—
“ In order to expedite settlement, Bin Sand has himself submitted memo^
randum setting forth tentatively his proposals for formulation of treaty.