ملف ٣٦٤\١٩١٣ "بلاد فارس: الوضع في فارس (الهجوم على الفوج التاسع والثلاثين من قوات الفرسان المركزية الهندية)" [ظ‎‎١‎٣‎٥] (٥٢٢/٢٧٥)

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• IX Vnr crood reasons the base of operations must be
5S“'i l I e ”r« of,l?«U. v,mn,.nt Amir M„j.hid mmt 1» ... to k,«
recourse to the Kashgais.
Measures taken at Tehran.
Serd^ 0 Ian* r arid e othe^ e ^m^anders r at T^ihan^and^o tli^Armr^M^^hld^a^Behteh^
to d sVatch forces immediately in concert with the measures taken at hlnraz by the
meted out to them. The Seed., Aasad
has also telegraphed in this sense.
00
Enclosure 3 in No. 1.
Consul O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.
(No. 205.) Shiraz, December 17, 1912.
(Telegrap ic.) ^ad an interview with Governor-General. He tells me he is
beino- pressed from Tehran to take immediate measures of some kind agams t e
mbhersN in order to allay excitement hd^Lmrdon and IS
anlthese constant 8 TobherS on the Bushk road, but he pomtt out that the general
state of order in Ears is decidedly better than it was before he took over charge of the
province and that occasional instances of robbery do not m any way alter the genera
53KWKS- «..«.,«!. mm. T h«
r ^ rirpmsture action a.o-ainst the robbers. It is, ot couise, ne says, qm ,
0 thn to E usua Persi ,n rabble army and to dispatch it into the hdls but as he
wrv'reasonably points out result is a foregone conclusion. No success can possibly attend
such ill-considered and unorganised efforts, and failure will leave situation worse than
it is now and will necessitate foreign occupation. He proposes, therefore, unless
forced into unwilling action by insistence of his own Government, to continue
methodical preparations for organisation of small but competent force on lines ahea«ly
indicated in my previous telegrams-that is to say, enlistment of about 10W
picked men, whom he hopes to have armed and ready for active operations in a »
'"° Thisls his general scheme, and if it at all meets with your approval I ventuie
with the greatest possible respect to urge that it may at least be given a t
His Maiesty’s Government decide to resort to more strenuous methods. L may not oe
acquainted with the various arguments which can be brought forward m avour
dispatchina an expedition into Southern Persia, but at the same tune I venture most
respectfully to counsel still a little further patience, and that Governor-General sh
be given chance to carry out task which we have ourselves set him, and m wine e
been hitherto supported and liberally assisted by His Majesty s Government As 1
have a ready urged, last incident cannot be regarded as altering fundamental pi y
existing situation, and I trust I may be pardoned if I venture to remind jou that this
series of outrages, commencing with attack on Smart last December and cu .. ^
in the death of Captain Eckford, can he attributed directly to the presence of Indian
cavalrv regiment in Southern Persia. This is very important consideration, and s o ,
1 think be borne in mind when reviewing the general situation. 1 am con
further’consideration will lead to conclusion that there is no immediate necessi y
decide on an expedition with all incalculable consequences and heavy expenses ol su
a step. And beyond all question it would be a grave error if the Governor- en
were now forced into taking some premature apt ion of which his own judg
disapproves, and which would almost certainly end in disaster. x r
As to the details of the Governor-General’s scheme, I propose, if this aspect ot
matter still interests you at all, to telegraph again more fully All I wish to act n
is that I think his general project is a sound and feasible one, but that m my op
will require assistance of one or more British officers to make it a success.