ملف ٣٦٤\١٩١٣ "بلاد فارس: الوضع في فارس (الهجوم على الفوج التاسع والثلاثين من قوات الفرسان المركزية الهندية)" [و‎‎٢‎٠‎٠] (٥٢٢/٤٠٤)

13
Memorandum of the Director of
Military Operations, 15th January
Pol. 183/12.
Proposal of the Government of India
to despatch a Native infantry regiment
to Bushire, and to subsidise the Chiefs.
Viceroy’s Telegram, 11th January 1912.
Pol. 99/12.
View of the Foreign Office, in
favour of evacuation, and of Sir G.
Barclay.
Sir Gr. Barclay’s Telegram No. 31, 11th
January 1912.
Sir Gr. Barclay's Telegram No. 32, 11th
January 1912.
Sir E. Grey’s Telegram No. 34, 16th
January 1912.
Sir E. Grey’s Telegram No. 38, 17th
January 1912.
Sir G. Bai’clay’s
18th January 1912.
Sir G. Barclay’s
19th. January 1912.
Telegram No. 54,
Telegram No. 55,
that the escort could not again be moved on the
road until punitive measures had been taken. He
(Mr. Knox) computed that there were 50,000 to
60,000 tribesmen m Ears, truculent and free from
restraint.
Mention may here be made of a Memo-
randum of the Director of Military Operations, dated
loth January 1912, in which he pointed out the
results of abandoning our position in the west of
bouthem Persia, and stated that to safeguard
irniraz, make good the lines of communications,
and carry out such punitive operations as might
be found necessary, we should require —
Two mixed brigades of infantry, each to include
a pioneer regiment.
/I wo Indian cavalry regiments, including the
regiment in Persia.
1 wo or more batteries of mountain artillery.
One lielo company of sappers and miners.
if military action were to be taken for such
tempo laiy occupation it should be taken promptly.
On the 11 th January the Government of
India again addressed the Secretary of State. They
now thought it possible that the situation might be
met oy sending a regiment of Native infantry to
Bushire and subsidising the tribal chiefs, who
would in return keep up guards on a regular
roster and on regular pay, while a special Assistant
to the Resident, on the analogy of the Political
Officer in the Khyber, would be employed to
supervise the arrangements.
23. On the same day, SirG. Barclay addressed
two telegrams to the Foreign Office. In one he
communicated the opinions of Colonel Douglas
(commanding the cavalry regiment) and of Mr.
Smart, both pointing to stringent measures. In the
other he expressed his conviction that no course
was open beyond the two alternatives of ( 1 ) the
occupation of Shiraz and the road, and (2)
evacuation. On the whole he would have favoured
the latter, if so large a force had not been necessary
for the purpose:
On the 16th January Sir E. Grey instructed
Sir G. Barclay, in a telegram repeated to India the
same day, that such force as would be necessary
should be sent to carry out evacuation from Shiraz.
He enquired whether the evacuation of Ispahan and
Vezd would also be required, and how Kerman
would be affected.
On the 17th January Sir E. Grey further
explained that we could not hold permanently by
force Shiraz and the roads, since a very large force
would be required, and we might be committed in
effect to the occupation of Southern Persia. Bushire
or Bunder Abbas, or both, could be occupied after
the withdrawal from Shiraz, till satisfaction had
been obtained and a return to Shiraz were possible.
In subsequent telegrams Sir G. Barclay ex
plained that, had it not been for the opinion of the
Officer Commanding on the military situation, he
S. 186 . d