مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [ظ‎‎٥‎١] (٥٤٠/١٠٣)

8
Charge d’Affaires called at the Foreign Office to ask on behalf of Ibn Sand
whether His Majesty’s Government had determined to adopt the partition scheme
without material change, because, if so, it would be very disappointing to him and
would place him in a most embarrassing position towards the Arab world. The
Arabs had looked to him for advice and help as soon as the report of the Royal
Commission had appeared. The Iraq Government had protested strongly against
the policy of His Majesty’s Government, whereas he, out of friendship for them
and his desire to bring about a general conciliation, had sent an entirely non
committal reply. If, however, His Majesty’s Government were not prepared to
take any further representations on behalf of the Arabs into account, his position
would become most invidious and embarrassing, and he would be regarded by the
Arab world as a traitor to the Arab cause. The Charge d’Affaires thought that,
in such circumstances, the King could hardly avoid coming out openly against the
policy of His Majesty’s Government. Opinion on the question was strong, not
only in Palestine and other Arab countries, but in Saudi. Arabia itself, and the
King could not ignore it indefinitely. Receiving no encouragement to assume that
there would be any serious changes in the scheme recommended by the Royal
Commission, he then asked whether, if the King accepted the principle of
partition—which it was not certain that he would do—and were to suggest
certain modifications designed to remedy what he regarded as injustices to the
Arabs, such suggestions would be considered by His Majesty’s Government. He
was told that, while the Foreign Office were anxious to avoid raising the hopes of
the Arabs unduly, they would always be ready to listen to any suggestions which
the King wished to put forward. The Royal Commission’s recommendations and
the statement of policy of His Majesty’s Government would, of course, have to be
considered by the Permanent Mandates Commission and by the Council of the
League, and it was contemplated in the statement of policy that a scheme of
partition would then have.to be worked out in detail. It was possible, therefore,
that certain changes might be introduced, but, the Foreign Office spokesman
repeated, he did not wish to raise Mr. Zada’s hopes unduly. On the 20th August
a statement was made by the Foreign Office to the Saudi Minister in reply to
further representations by Ibn Saud. It was explained to him that, after the
League of Nations had expressed its opinion, an opportunity would be afforded
for full examination of the situation with representatives of both Arabs and Jews,
and that while His Majesty’s Government still thought that partition on the
general lines of the report offered the best hope of solution, there was no reason
why the King should not put forward suggestions of his own. They would receive
the close attention of His Majesty’s Government, who, however/felt obliged to
make it clear that they would have to take into account that they had obligations
to Arabs and Jews alike.
25. On the 26th August Sheikh Hafiz Wahba left London for Riyadh on
urgent instructions from Ibn Saud, who wished to consult him about the Palestine
question and to give him instructions. The following day a representative of the
Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs brought to His Majesty’s Charge d’Affaires
in Jedda a message from Ibn Saud to the following effect
Sheikh Kamil-al-Qassab, a representative of the National Committee of
Palestine and Syria, had arrived at Riyadh a week earlier to find out the views
of Ibn Saud and to discuss the holding of an Arab conference in Damascus or
Bagdad. Ibn Saud had told him that, in accordance with his invariable policy
towards His Majesty’s Government, he had dealt with them direct and had not
published his views, which he did not wish to make public. He had explained
that negotiations with His Majesty’s Government were in progress, and had
persuaded Qassab to abandon the idea of a conference, and also his plan to go to
Sana on a similar mission to the Imam. The Secretary of State sent a message of
warm appreciation for this information, and an expression of his conviction that
the action taken by Ibn Saud would prove to have been in the best interests of all
concerned. A fortnight later, however, Ibn Saud sent a letter to the Legation
saying that Kamil-al-Qassab had returned to Syria later than had been intended,
and that m the interval certain persons who wished a conference to be held had
issued invitations and that others from Iraq had agreed: the convenors had
apologised to Ibn Saud, saying that they agreed with him and wished to comply
with his desire, but the arrangements for the conference had progressed too far to
be changed. The conference eventually met at Bludan, in Syria, and passed
resolutions showing uncompromising hostility to partition.