مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [و‎‎٥‎٩] (٥٤٠/١١٨)

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having a very small urban population among which to find men with a suitable
preliminary training in mechanical work, &c., might find it more difficult than,
e.a., Egypt, to produce suitable candidates for aviation. Sir R. Bullard suggested
that, whereas it might suit the Italians to undertake the training of any number
of Saudis because of the political effect it might be expected to have, His Majesty’s
Government would be reluctant to embark on any scheme that would not have
a reasonable chance of success. He also asked the King what His Majesty thought
would be the effect upon the Italians of any close relationship between His
Majesty’s Government and Saudi Arabia in matters of aviation. Was there any
reason to think that this might encourage them to seek to extend their influence
elsewhere, e.g., in the Yemen? It was true that the Italians had themselves
wished to identify themselves closely with Saudi Arabia in aviation affairs, but
how far was that merely a phase of the war with Ethiopia and theii hostility
to His Majesty’s Government on that point? The King said that the Italians
still wished to be allowed to develop Saudi aviation, and implied that he did not
care what they thought. He added bitterly that the pilots ti ained in Italy
were no good. At one point in the conversation the King said that if Iraq
shook itself free of Turkish influence he would not mind having some Iiaqis to
help in aviation later on.
85. At the third interview the King said that he wanted to speak about his
future in relation to His Majesty’s Government, but he reached that subject by
a circuitous route, beginning with some talk about the Saudi-Iraq Treaty of
Friendship and Alliance, the Temen and the League of Nations. He then
that he had often been asked whether the Arab States of the Persian Gulf could
not adhere to the Saudi-Iraq Treaty. He had fended off such enquiries, alleging
the unimportance of such States, but he would be glad to know the opinion of
His Majesty’s Government. Mr. Rendel reminded His Majesty of the position
of His Majesty’s Government in the Gulf. They had had relations with the
Arab'rulers there in some cases for as long as a century and a half, having been
compelled to take action in regard to gun-running, piracy, the slave trade, &c.
As a result, as had been made clear at the time of the Treaty of Jedda, the
foreign affairs of Koweit, Bahrein, Qatar and the Trucial Sheikhdoms weie in
the hands of His Majesty’s Government, who exercised sovereignty over them
in those affairs, and therefore could not allow them to enter into treaty
relations with any foreign State. Ibn Saud seemed to accept this statement
without demur.
86. This subject led to a discussion of the eastern frontier of Saudi Arabia,
but the King seemed very anxious to pass on to another subject, and he now
reached the point with which he had begun, viz., his future in relation to His
Majesty’s Government. What would happen to him in the case of war ? Suppose
war beo’an in Europe, or in the Yemen, or anywhere? Could not His Majesty’s
Government make some treaty or some other lesser understanding with him ? It
could be secret if they wished.
87. Mr. Rendel said that any such undertaking, and more especially any
kind of secret guarantee, was precluded by the British constitutional system,
which would in any case make its eventual fulfilment uncertain. Sir R. Bullard
added that His Majesty’s Government were obliged, as members of the League
of Nations, to register all treaties with the League. Mr. Rendel then went on
to say, as he had said the previous day, that he could haidly imagine any
occasion on which a threat to Saudi Arabia would not be a thieat to His Majesty s
Government, and added that this community of interests was a stronger bond
than any treaty. We had given too many promises in the past, under pressure
of war in particular, and could not give one in this case. Sii R. Bullaid
reminded the King once more of the terms of the Rome Agreement of 1927.
His Majesty’s Government had recorded in writing that they regarded it as
a cc vital imperial interest that no European Power should establish itself on the
Arabian shore of the Red Sea.” The King seemed to derive comfort from this
conversation.
88. When speaking about Palestine, in the last interview, Ibn Baud said
that there were many enemies watching for an opportunity to injure Great
Britain. The chief of these was, of course, Italy. The attempt that Italy was
making to win recognition as the friend of Moslems in general, and of the
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