ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣ الجزء ١٠ "الحدود الشمالية الغربية: البعثة الروسية المقترحة المختصة بعلم الحيوان" [و‎‎٣‎١‎٥] (٦٦٤/٢٢١)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.1
^ N
[Ju
ic 30.]
r. a.
.. . > EO
]
non 1 .
i
EASTERN.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[95840] No. 1. :
*s
General &ir Jh. AUenbij to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 30.)
(No. 278.) ' v '
My Lord, . Cairo, June 15 1919
WITH leference to my despatch No. 269 of the 11th June, I have the honour to
forward copies of a further note by^ Captain Garland, of the Arab Bureau, carrying on
the narrative of events connected with the Khurma dispute to the 10th June.
• I have, &c.
E. H. H. ALLENBY.
Enclosure in No. 1.
A ote by Captain Garland on the Khurma Dispute.
Latest Information.
LAfEB reports from Jeddah have confirmed the completeness of Abdullah’s defeat
at Tarabah. ^ According to a telegram sent by the King to Emir Feisal, the “martyrs”
(i.e., bhereefian killed) amounted to 250, including several Ateibah Sheikhs, and also
Seyyid Hilmi, who was Abdullah’s Major-General Commanding the so-called “division”
of regular troops. Emirs Abdullah and Shakir were themselves slightly wounded, all
guns and machine guns and two-thirds of the supplies were lost, and only one-tenth of
the mule mounted infantry got away.
It is worthy of note that, although they had had previous warning of the night
attack, the regular officers who got away did so in their night attire. It was ever one
of the Bagdadi officer s maxims not to allow military duties to interfere with his
night s rest, and during the war, outposts, pickets, and the like were invariablv
dispensed with by the Hedjaz armies.
The 10,000 Bedouin originally reported to be with Abdullah seem to have melted
away and, as Colonel Bassett remarks, “ everything points to the majority of the tribal
elements which profess allegiance to King Hussein being absolutely unreliable.” A
consoling feature is that the captors of the guns, See., have no followers trained in their
manipulation and employment.
In spite of the King’s assertion that Ibn Saud reinforced Tarabah and Khurma,
with a view to attacking Abdullah, no enemy advance from Tarabah is reported.
Abdullah, according to the King, is now “ remaining on the defensive,” but both he and
the King fear an advance by Ibn Saud on Tail and Mecca.
It is thought, however, that Ibn Saud will now rest content with his success and
his reoccupation of larabah. He has common sense enough to realise that any further
advance towards the Hedjaz cities would mean sacrificing our friendship, subsidy,
and help, and he must realise that we possess the means to punish him even if he knows
the King does not. It seems probable that His Britannic Majesty’s Government’s
orders to withdraw from Tarabah will have the desired effect when he gets them.
The fact that the Ikhwan have not advanced from Tarabah since they recaptured
it tends to show that Ibn Saud has them under some sort of control, and if the more
fanatical elements had intended to raid Taif without his authority, they would surely
have moved towards it by this time.
. On the arrival^ of our aeroplanes, the King will no doubt insist on immediate
punitive bombing raids of Tarabah, Khurma, and other Ikhwan camps, but it appears
necessary that tiie possible results of such action should be well considered before
undertaking it. From every point of view it will be infinitely better if Ibn Saud can
be compelled to withdraw by political pressure from Bagdad, as aeroplane bombing
would increase the hatred and ill-vvill between Nejd and Mecca, would render future
reconciliation more difficult, would henceforth affect the hospitality extended to British
official travellers through Nejd, and might quite conceivably precipitate a wholesale
conflagration, besides possibly forming matter (suitably distorted) for Indian anti-
Shereefian propaganda.
[2 gg- 1 ] /~1 ^ 1
(j 1
Ml