مجموعة ٦/٨٤ "اليمن: موقف حكومة اليمن من النزاع الإيطالي-الإثيوبي. سياسة الحكومة البريطانية في حالة احتلال إيطاليا لأراضٍ يمنية." [ظ‎‎١‎١‎١] (٦٩٩/٢٢٢)

Blue Shirts. Maher and Nokrashi will not come into the open yet, as they realise
that the magic of Nahas’s name with the masses would be too much for them at
the present stage; but if the people become dissatisfied through maladministra
tion. and Nahas begins to lose in office the halo which he developed in opposition
under the blows of Sidky’s policemen, then those two masters of secret organisation
and the political plot (it is Nokrashi actually who controls the party machine!^
of the Wafd) might decide to strike at their leader.
14. The chief trouble with Egypt is that its political and civil life is
still controlled by that old clique of politicians who were either brought up in
the traditions of the corrupt Turkish school or received their training in the
demagogic days of the Nationalist movement. A new generation of public-
spirited civil servants is beginning to appear, but it is still small, and it will be
some time before it displaces the older clique. The most outstanding personality
of this new generation is Amin Osman, the new Under-Secretary for Finance,
who before long will be in the Cabinet.
The Egyptian Attitude to the Sudan under the New Regime.
15. For some time to come, at least, the official Egyptian attitude to the
Sudan will, I believe, be correct. Nahas means to behave himself and create a
good impression; and it is unlikely that the implementation of the treaty will
cause us any trouble. The Egyptians will now concentrate on developing ties
with the Sudan—visits, financial help to schools, possibly (though not very likely)
economic projects, &c. Occasionally, of course, we may have embarrassing
incidents, outbursts of indiscretions, &c., such as may very likely attend on the
proposed visit to us this winter of 100 Egyptian students.
There will be at the beginning, that is to say, a good deal of fraternisation,
repeated emphasis on the ties that bind the two countries together, &c. As,
however, the Sudanese themselves would not welcome any suggestion that the
treaty has given Egypt new rights in the Sudan, and as the Egyptians are anxious
not to appear to their darker cousins to be claiming any sort of right over them,
they will, I think, exercise caution and restraint. The Egyptians have been made
to realise (by the Fagr articles, by Sheikh Ahmed Othman-el-Qadi’s conversa
tions in Egypt, &c.), that any over-insistence by them on their share in
the Condominium would stress their character as rulers in Sudanese eyes; and
that the Sudanese would resent their appearance in this role. Hence the stress,
from their side, will be not so much on their active share in the Condominium
as on fraternisation under the protection of the Condominium.
And personally, I believe that any excess of interest they show in the Sudan
during the next few years as a result of the treaty will gradually decrease as
the novelty of the new regime wears off.