خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎١‎٣] (٢٤٨/٢٥)

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[72—139] ’ d
101. The Persian Government are showing an interest in developing trade
with India, and have deputed Dr. Ali Amini, a senior officer of the Ministry
of Finance, to visit India and explore the possibility of strengthening the com
mercial links between the two countries.
A merican Interests.
102. The visit of Senator Pepper in September on his way home from
Moscow, served as an occasion for the exchange of American-Persian compli
ments. In a press account of a party given to Mr. Pepper by the Speaker of the
Majlis, the Senator was reported as expressing the affection of Americans for
Persians and declaring that the American Government supported the indepen
dence of small countries, and neither interfered themselves nor allowed others
to interfere in the affairs of weak nations. According to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Senator Pepper expressed the same thoughts, but even more strongly,
at a dinner given to him at the Ministry. The fact that in the speech at the
Majlis he declared that it was attachmeni to Persia that had prompted his visit
to Tehran did not prevent Senator Pepper from pressing the request of an
American airline for facilities in Persia. With disarming simplicity he
explained to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that while the average American
is full of idealism, a little concrete interest always helps.
103. For some time the T.W.A. (Transcontinental Western Air) had been
negotiating with a Persian company, offering terms which left the management
% to the Americans and the risk to the Persians, hut the negotiations fell through.
The American Embassy then applied for facilities for this company and at
the same time urged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to sign the Chicago Agree
ments, including the Air Transport Agreement. Knowing nothing about the
Chicago Agreements, and being in general against the signature of anything in
the nature of a concession until the last of the foreign troops should have left,
the Minister for Foreign Affairs pleaded for time to consider the matter, in
spite of the argument advanced by the American Ambassador that to give the
Americans this material stake in Persia would engage the interest of the United
States against possible aggression by Russia—aggression which he suggested
Great Britain would hardly be able to meet alone.
104. Having learned (thanks to the British air attache) what the Chicago
Agreements with their Five Freedoms involved, the Minister for Foreign Affairs
decided (1) to tell the American Ambassador that the Persian Government must
postpone consideration of so complicated a matter but (2) to offer to the Americans
permission for their civil aircraft to fly to and from Tehran without prejudice
to any future arrangement, and (3) to promise that after the withdrawal of the
foreign troops the Persian Government would be prepared to conclude with the
United States a civil aviation agreement, provided that it took account of the
aviation rights and needs of Persia in this region.
105. The hesitation shown by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the
American demand for air rights intensified the annoyance which the American
Ambassador was already feeling at the criticisms published in some of the
Tehran newspapers at the news that the United States Government intended
to remove from Persia not only certain assets it needed but the remainder too,
unless the Persian Government or Persian individuals were prepared to pay for
them. The attacks were usually based on the fact that the presence of American
troops in Persia had never been sanctioned by the conclusion of an agreement,
and some times they proliferated into abuse of the United States or into criti
cisms of the behaviour of the American troops in Persia. On the 27th September
the American Embassy published a communique explaining the attitude of the
American Government in regard to the assets, and asserting that if the presence
of American troops was not governed by an agreement that was because the
Persian Government delayed discussion of a draft put forward in 1943 by the
American Ambassador, not only on behalf of his Government, but personally. He
considered an agreement to be necessary. These attacks were resented by the
American Ambassador not only on behalf of his Government but personally. He
had long regarded himself as the champion of Persian independence, and as proof
he claimed to have been the author of the Declaration about Persia, which was
issued after the Tehran Conference in 1943; and in his violent reaction against
what he considered ingratitude to him in person he presented a sad spectacle
of the disillusioned sentimentalist.
106. Although we did not hear of it officially until October, Mr. Murray
was worrying about the failure of the Persian Government to make use of the