خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎١‎٦] (٢٤٨/٣٢)

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difference of opinion between the two Governments on the subject. It was
suggested that it would assist Persia and, incidentally, His Majesty’s Govern
ment, if the United States Government would tell the Soviet Government that
they regarded it as desirable that the evacuation of Persia should start at an
early date. It was left to the discretion of His Majesty’s Ambassador whether
to inform the State Department that we were not prepared to withdraw any
troops except pari passu with the Russians, and that the extent of our with
drawal was limited by the obligation, until the end of the war with Japan, to
protect the oil-fields and the refinery. A few days later the iVmerican press
reported the Acting Secretary of State as saying, with regard to the Persian
Government’s note, that the United States Government naturally sympathised
with the Persian Government’s point of view, and that it was, he believed, well-
known that the number of American troops in Persia was already being rapidly
reduced.
5. The attitude of the American Embassy in Tehran was disappointing.
This was seen at its worst in a harangue by the American Counsellor, who
argued that whatever we did Persia would be eaten up by Russia in a few years
anyhow, and whose conscience disapproved the British attempt to induce the
Persians, by the placing of a time-limit on Allied offers of assets for sale, to make
up their minds quickly—and thereby give no excuse to any foreign Ally to retain
troops to guard its assets. The heart of the counsellor bled like anything, but
as it was not quite clear whether the wound was caused by British brutality in
trying to hustle the East, or by fear that haste might produce fewer dollars
for American assets, it was difficult to find the right styptic. Even the new
ambassador, Mr. Wallace Murray, in spite of his avowed suspicion of Russian
motives, deprecated a too speedy withdrawal of British troops lest this should
interfere with the sale of assets.
6. In reply to the communication from His Majesty’s Embassy m
Washington the State Department said that they were drafting a reply to the
Persian note agreeing to the idea of withdrawing troops from Persia before the
final treaty date. The State Department agreed that it would be desirable foi
British and American troops not to be withdrawn except pari passu with the
Russian, but on the other hand said that the War Department would not wish
to delay the withdrawal of American troops for political reasons. I he Wai
Department would wish to leave, until the end of the war with Japan, 500 men
to service the air transport command, besides leaving guards on military installa
tions and properties until their final disposal, which might take many months.
The State Department were considering what, if anything, they would say to
the Russians. , , , ^
7 The nature of His Majesty’s Government s reply to the I ersian note
was communicated to the Soviet Government in Moscow on the 31st May. The
communication was to add that His Majesty’s Government now wished to propose
formally that Allied troops should start withdrawing from Persia pari passu
and in stages before the final treaty date, and that military talks should be held
to discuss the stages in which such withdrawals might take place. No reply had
been received by the end of the quarter—perhaps because arrangements for a
meetino- 0 f the Big Three had already been made. The Persian Ambassador m
Moscow could get" no information from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
beyond the fact that the question “ was bein^ considered carefully.” The Soviet
Ambassador was in his permanent state of having received no instructions, but
he assured the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the presence of the Soviet troops
was only temporary and that the mere removal of material would take a long
time g a possible hindrance to our good intentions came to light with the
discovery that when the transfer of the railway to the Persian Government
relieved the British forces of the responsibility of guarding it, the railway
brigade would be moved from the railway and housed in the camp at Hamadan
no longer required by the Americans. The advantage of good ready-made quarters
in a good climate was fully realised by His Majesty’s Embassy, but it seemed
that ft would completely wreck our attempt to secure a substantial withdrawal
of Soviet troops if at this moment we placed a large body of troops much farther
forward than ever before, and quite close to Qazvm the point above all whicn
it is desirable to clear of Soviet forces. It was found however, that once free
of its duties on the railway, the railway brigade would not be needed in Persia
at all and the plan to use the Hamadan camp was abandoned. This was
fortunate, for the pro-Russian newspapers in Tehran were already announcing
the arrival of British troops as well as a great increase in the British forces
t