خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎٨‎٠] (٢٤٨/١٦٠)

4
information connected with the Axis plot of last year, and that the arrest of
certain dangerous Persians if necessary by ourselves in view of the utter
corruption and inefficiency of the Persian police—would have a salutary effect.
ulfy leahsed that such arrests might annoy the American Government, but, on
the othei hand, 1 considered our case had become immeasurably stronger in that
we weie now responsible lor the security of American troops transporting
supplies to Kussia. Further, as far as the Soviet Government were concerned
such action was in their real interests and was intended to ensure the safe arrival^
of aid to Russia without interruption. I had in the meantime discussed the
matter with my Soviet colleague and pressed for close co-operation. He replied
that he had already asked his Government for authority to request the Persian
(government to arrest certain Persian suspects.
15. I was in due course authorised by you to make use of our knowledge of
the plot at my discretion, but you were doubtful of the advisability of our
arresting the Persian suspects ourselves. At the same time you explained the
whole position to the American and Soviet Governments, and invited the latter
to send instructions to their representative in Tehran to discuss with me the
question of the arrest by the Persian Government of certain dangerous Persians
with a view to reaching agreement on a common line of action. It was felt that
such joint action would be far more effective. As it was evident that direct
American participation was hardy to be expected, the most that could be hoped
for from the American Government was general friendly support.
16. 1 he authority given to me to make use of information about the plot
arrived at a most opportune moment, as the Deputy, Naubakht, had just tabled
an interpellation of the Government, and of the Minister for War in particular
attacking the Government and the Allies. I accordingly furnished the Prime
Minister and the Minister for War with suitable evidence regarding Naubakht’s
pro-Ax is and other treasonable activities, both in connexion with the plot and
since that date, so as to enable them to produce a crushing reply. In order to
test the sincerity of the Prime Minister’s recent offer to me to arrest anybody
against whom I might be able to produce proper evidence, I at the same time in
a letter of the 5th August requested him to withdraw Naubakht’s parliamentary
immunity to enable him to be arrested and sent to Sultanabad for detention and
interrogation in accordance with the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1942. After
the usual delays the interpellation was finally fixed for the 24th August, but
Naubakht, undoubtedly scenting danger and realising how weak his hand had
become, particularly in view of the arrest of certain Germans in Tehran, failed
to put in an appearance. The Government did not feel themselves strong enough
to ask the Majlis to remove his immunity, and it is now reported that he and his
son have fled to the Shiraz district.
17. It soon became clear that, if the Axis-controlled organisations were tq
be really effectively dislocated, a much larger number of arrests than orio-inally
foreseen would have to be effected. Accordingly, a list of about 140 suspects,
including seventy Persian railway employees known to be implicated in railway
sabotage organisations, was prepared and communicated by me to my Soviet and
American colleagues. Amongst those whose names figured in the list were such
persons as ^ Kashani, Kupal, Pourzand, Naubakht, &c. General Connollv.
American General Officer Commanding, whom I also consulted regarding tiU
suspect railway employees, promised full collaboration. The attitude of mv
American colleague was more satisfactory than last year, and I hoped to be able
to rely on his acquiescence in the arrests. At the time my Soviet colleague had
not received final instructions, and it was not until the 29th August that I handed
to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs the full Anglo-Soviet
list of 162 suspects with a request that they should be arrested and sent to
Sultanabad for detention and interrogation. It was made clear to the Prime
Minister that written evidence in all cases would be forthcoming as soon as the
majority of the suspects were safely under lock and key at Sultanabad. My
Soviet colleague spoke in the same sense immediately afterwards. We both
assured the I l ime Mumstei that we would continue to give him our support if
he agreed to our request. The Prime Minister then promised to give orders for
the arrests to begin at dawn on the 30th August. So far the arrests have been
effected smoothly and efficiently by the Persian authorities, and it is most
gratifying that the demands of the Allies have been executed with such little
disturbance to the normal life of the country. In particular, the co-operation of
the American military on the railway was extremely helpful. Up to the present
about 110 suspects have been arrested. So far it has been unnecessary for me
except in the case of the railway employees, to avail myself of the discretion