مجموعة ٣٠/ ١٣ "الخليج الفارسي: قاعدة هنجام البحرية؛ مسألة نقلها للبحرين؛ مسح خليج خور القليعة" [ظ‎‎١‎٤‎٣] (٣٦٠/٢٨٦)

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** هذه التواريخ تقريبية Teh. Desp. 54,
July (i 1926, P. 2604.
* Adm. to F.O.,
Oct. 15 1926, P.3629.
t F.O. to I.O.. Nov. 6
1926, P. 3847.
t G. of I. to I.O.,
Jan. 6 1927,
P. 376/27.
§ F.O. to I.O., Jan. 4
1927. P. 67/27.
|| A.M. to F.O.,
July 27 1927, P.3751.
f F.O. to A.M.,
Aug. 11 1927,
P. 4969/27.
Teh. Desp. 455,
Sept. 21 1927.
P. 4969/27.
Senior Naval Officer
to Adm., 1136/12
Aug. 12 1928,
P. 4315.
property possessed by His Majesty’s Government m the coaling stations at
Basidu and Henjam, ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية and the status of the concession and the arguments
for its retention underwent further investigation by the Home Depaitments
concerned and by the Government of India.
18. The Admiralty expressed the view that the coaling stations were still m
required, 0 while, from a different standpoint, the Foreign Office, in connection v
with a complaint received about this time from 1 ersia of the refusal of the
British Agent at Basidu to pay customs dues, remarked that in view of
the effect on the status of Henjam of admitting the Persian claim to Basidu,
“it would be dangerous to allow doubt to be cast on the validity of the
British rights to Basidu, which rest on undisturbed occupation over a long
period.”! The report of the Government of India reaffirmed the view
expressed by their predecessors in 1808 (para. 11 above) as to the status of
Basidu, and* added that the station was maintained solely for political
reasons and as a bargaining counter in negotiations for the recognition of
the British position in Henjam or for some other consideration.^ They
regarded it as essential that neither Basidu, after relinquishment, nor any
other fuelling station in the Gulf should be leased by Persia to any other
Power.
19. An amicable settlement of the Persian complaint referred to in
para. 18 was reached§ and it proved possible to avoid any formal discussion
of the general question with Persia.
20. The Air Ministry, having in July 1921 raised the question of
establishing a seaplane base at Basidu, were referred by the Foreign Office
to the opinion expressed by the Government of India, and informed that
Basidu was retained “mainly as a possible asset in negotiations with the-
Persian Governmentthat the British position in it was extremely weak,
and that there would be the strongest political objection to their proposal.^
21. The possibility of an arrangement with Persia in respect of Henjam
on the basis of surrender of Basidu was touched on in unofficial
discussion between Sir L. Haworth and the Belgian Director-General of
Customs in September 1927, and was well received; but the matter was not
pursued.
Incident of August—September 1928.
22. There were no further developments till August 1928, when the
Senior Naval Officer in the Gulf reported that the Persian Customs official
in Persian Basidu, who had previously told the British caretaker that Persian
troops would occupy British Bastdu in a few weeks, claimed the right, under
instructions from Bundar Abbas, to collect taxes in British Basidu, in which,
he said, the British flag had no more significance than a consular flag.
23. The Political Resident requested the Senior Naval Officer to keep a
ship off Basidu, and, should Persia attempt to occupy the concession, state
that this could not be permitted without the orders of His Majesty’s
Government. The Government of India, who were seriously disturbed by
the Persian threat, which was closely followed by an attempt by the Persian
Customs Mudir, which was prevented by the Captain of H.M.S. Lupin, to
arrest a man within the concession, urged that His Majesty’s Government
should either—
(а) warn Persia that any molestation of British Basidu would be
regarded as an unfriendly act; or
(б) send a small landing party to remain in Basidu until the situation
cleared.
24. The Foreign Office saw objection to the first alternative, which they
thought likely to provoke a definite challenge by Persia, as did the Charge
d’Affaires, Teheran. As regards the second, they were not prepared to take
any action which might lead to an incident at Basidu, and so could not aoree
to the landing of a party save with orders to withdraw under protest if
challenged. To action on these lines the Admiralty, with whom the India
Office agreed, saw strong objection. The India Office suggested in the
circumstances reversion to action on the lines taken by Sir L. Haworth as
described in para. 23 above.