مجموعة ٢/٥٤ "لجنة الشرق الأوسط (الرسمية): مجموعة العمل" [ظ‎‎١‎٩‎٥] (٦٤٢/٣٩٠)

GREATER TRAMSJORDAN
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1. INTRODUCTION
!• The State of Greater Transjordan - i.e.
Arab Palestine - is now a political fact. Its "boundaries on •
the western side have not, of course, yet been agreed, but it
raay be estimated that the population of the new State will
amount to about 800,000 excluding the 500,000 refugees who
are at present established in it. To ensure the stability
and prosperity of this new State must be for some time to come
a cardinal factor- of our foreign policy in the Middle East.
Transjordan itself is, however, still in a state of primitive
rural economy and its standard of living is low, particularly .
in comparison with the standard of living enjoyed by Arab
Palestine under the Mandatory Government.
2. The known economic resources of Greater Transjordan are
slight. Her major assets are the extensive phosphate desposits
near Amman in the north and Ma’an in the south, which have so
far only been developed to an extremely limited degree, owing
partly to transport difficulties and partly to lack of markets,
and the Potash Works at the north end of the Dead Sea, which it
is hoped will remain in Transjordan territory when the peace
settlement with Israel is concluded but which .have been totally
destroyed by Jewish and Arab action. There are’ limited
agricultural development possibilities, involving irrigation
works in the Jordan Valley and improvement of crop production
in the hill lands of Arab Palestine. A subsidiary of the Iraq
Petroleum Company is prospecting for oil but no deposits have
so far been found. The broad conclusion has been reached by
H.M. Minister at Amman and H.M. Consulate-General at Jerusalem
that Greater Transjordan could become an economically viable
state, but only at a low standard of living. This means, in
fact, that the standard of living of Arab Palestine will have
to be reduced to the level of that at present prevailing in
Transjordan proper, and such a reduction will, in certain
respects at least, be drastic. (It is estimated, for instance,
that expenditure on public services such as health and education
will have to be reduced by about 80$). This conclusion was
reached without taking into account the burden imposed upon
Transjordan by the necessity for absorbing at least a large / ‘'
proportion of 500,000 refugees. (See II below). Unless, •
therefore, some unexpected development occurs, such as the „
discovery of oil otf the sudden opening up of large markets for 1
her phosphates, it is likely to be many years before the new
state will be able to earn a revenue sufficient to provide for
a substantial rise in the cost of living. Meanwhile, financial
assistance from outside sources i$ required for development
projects (a) to make possible the resettlement of the Arab
refugees, and (b) to enable the new state to become established
on a sound economic basis. The political stability of Arab
Palestine largely depends upon the progress which the
Transjordan government can make in restoring some measure of
economic prosperity.
II. PRESENT FINANCIAL POSITION
3. Transjordan's present financial position is precarious.
Her imports in 1947 were at the rate of million per annum
(including £ 3 > 300,000 for'the I.P.C. )»and in 1948 at £ll|r
million (including £5V0 9 OQO for the I.P..C.) (The increase in
1948 ifl accounted 1 for by theinoods of Arab Palestine* and
actually indicates a decrease in the imports of Transjordan itself).
/Recorded
Trans j ordan plCis